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Responsibility to protect (RtoP) is a recent concept of international politics, whose 
goal is to define the best attitude to adopt when the world is confronted to grave humanitarian 
crises. Within RtoP, each state carries the primary responsibility to protect human beings 
living in its territory. The international society carries a collective duty to solve a 
humanitarian crisis when a state has failed to fulfil this responsibility. In order to proceed, the 
international society may need to use coercive action against the state. The objective of the 
master thesis is to better understand how the RtoP concept is being implemented in 
international affairs. For this purpose, it scrutinizes two recent humanitarian crises which 
have raised substantial concern in the international society. 
The Syrian conflict constitutes an evident case where the international society failed to 
fulfil its responsibility to protect. Populations suffering from mass atrocities and their 
consequences are left on their own, because the international society is being unable to 
respond collectively. In contrast, the RtoP had been used to justify international intervention 
in the Libya conflict in response to a threatening humanitarian crisis. The concept RtoP 
implies a series of conditions whose purpose is to grant legitimacy and effectiveness to an 
international intervention aimed at solving a humanitarian crisis. The master thesis examines 
how these conditions were met in the cases of Syria and Libya, and which of them proved to 
be determinant for triggering international intervention. 
The results of the study show that an intervention is critically conditioned by the 
existence of a consensus at the highest authority in international affairs. Mistrust between key 
states of the international society, but also poorly defined perspectives post-intervention, may 




	   1	  
Acknowledgements  
 
First of all, I would like to express my profound intellectual satisfaction after having followed 
the master program in democracy building. It has been such a pleasure to follow so many 
high-quality lectures. It was there I first heard about the principle of Responsibility to Protect 
(RtoP) and I have after that, been really enthusiastic and engaged. Believing in the 
humanitarian principles of the United Nations RtoP is one of the most important 
developments the humanity needs to achieve.   
 I thank my supervisor, Pål Hermod Bakka for encouraging me when I believed I was 
going wrong. Even though I found the topic fascinating, I first doubted that my questions 
about humanitarian intervention could constitute a real research subject. Thanks to your 
support, I managed to put my grossly formulated ideas on the paper. Thank you for your 
patience.  
 Thanks a lot to my group leader and my friend, Kristine, for giving me the time to 
finish the writing of my thesis. Thanks to my friends and my family for your support.  
 I have been very lucky to meet two wonderful persons during my master thesis. I am 
amazed by their courage and their never-ending hope for a better future in their homeland, 
Syria. Thanks a lot, Ammar and Yahya, for your friendship. I hope it will last forever.  
Last but not least I need to thank my husband. Without you I would not have manage 
this thesis. During all this period you have been patiently listening to me and you have 
discussed with me, guiding me to see things in different perspectives. Uncomplainingly you 
have read through numerous drafts of my thesis, always giving me positive comments and 
motivating me to hold on. You are absolutely awesome.  
This thesis is dedicated to my dear daughter, Caroline. I wish you never lose your faith 










	   2	  
Table of contents 
 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT ....................................................................................... 3	  
1. 1 INTERVENTIONISM IN THE BEGINNING OF THE 21ST CENTURY ............................................ 3	  
1.2 HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN A DEVELOPING NORMATIVE 
LANDSCAPE ............................................................................................................................. 5	  
1.3 RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT ............................................................................................ 6	  
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS ............................................. 10	  
CHAPTER 2. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ..................................................... 11	  
2.1 TO PREVENT, TO REACT, TO REBUILD ............................................................................... 11	  
2.2 MILITARY INTERVENTION AND THE GUIDING CRITERIA ................................................... 13	  
CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................ 18	  
3.1 CASE STUDY .................................................................................................................... 18	  
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN ........................................................................................................... 19	  
3.3 DATA SOURCE ................................................................................................................. 20	  
3.3.1	  Data	  availability	  for	  Syria	  ............................................................................................................................	  20	  
3.3.2	  Data	  availability	  for	  Libya	  ............................................................................................................................	  21	  
CHAPTER 4. THE SYRIAN AND LIBYAN CRISES (2011-2015) .................................. 22	  
4.1 THE MODERN SYRIA: FROM DICTATORSHIP TO CIVIL WAR ............................................... 22	  
4.1.1	  The	  brutal	  crackdown	  of	  the	  Syrian	  uprising	  in	  2011	  .....................................................................	  24	  
4.1.2	  Crimes	  against	  humanity	  and	  war	  crimes	  documented	  early	  on	  during	  the	  Syrian	  conflict
	  .............................................................................................................................................................................................	  26	  
4.1.3	  Large-­‐scale	  attacks	  against	  civilians	  .......................................................................................................	  27	  
4.1.5	  The	  conflict	  in	  Syria	  now	  ...............................................................................................................................	  31	  
4.1.6	  The	  different	  faces	  of	  the	  Syrian	  opposition	  .........................................................................................	  32	  
4.1.7	  International	  responses	  to	  the	  Syrian	  crisis	  .........................................................................................	  33	  
4.1.7.1	  UN	  resolutions	  ..............................................................................................................................................................................	  33	  
4.1.7.2	  The	  League	  Of	  Arab	  States	  ......................................................................................................................................................	  35	  
4.1.7.3	  Other	  initiatives	  to	  solve	  the	  Syrian	  crisis	  .......................................................................................................................	  36	  
4.2 GADDAFI’S LIBYA ........................................................................................................... 37	  
4.2.1	  The	  brutal	  crackdown	  of	  the	  Libyan	  uprising	  ......................................................................................	  39	  
4.2.2	  The	  Libyan	  Opposition	  ....................................................................................................................................	  40	  
4.2.3	  Libya’s	  Civil	  War	  ...............................................................................................................................................	  40	  
4.2.4	  International	  Responses	  to	  the	  Libyan	  crisis	  ........................................................................................	  41	  
4.2.4.1	  UN	  Resolutions	  .............................................................................................................................................................................	  41	  
4.2.4.2	  Military	  intervention	  in	  Libya	  ...............................................................................................................................................	  42	  
4.2.4.3	  AU’s	  peace	  initiative	  ...................................................................................................................................................................	  43	  
4.2.4.4	  Other	  initiatives	  ...........................................................................................................................................................................	  44	  
4.2.5	  Libya	  after	  the	  death	  of	  Gaddafi	  ................................................................................................................	  44	  
4.3 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE LIBYAN AND SYRIAN CRISIS ........................................ 45	  
4.3.1	  Just	  cause	  ..............................................................................................................................................................	  45	  
4.3.2	  Right	  authority	  ..................................................................................................................................................	  47	  
4.3.3	  Right	  intention	  ...................................................................................................................................................	  49	  
4.3.4	  Last	  resort	  ............................................................................................................................................................	  52	  
4.3.5	  Proportional	  means	  .........................................................................................................................................	  54	  
4.3.6	  Reasonable	  prospects	  .....................................................................................................................................	  58	  
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 62	  
REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 65	  
 
	   3	  
“I also believe that, if we are to take human rights seriously, we must embrace the concept of 
‘the responsibility to protect,’ as a basis for collective action to prevent and stop instances of 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. This is not meant as a way to bypass 
sovereignty, since each State remains, first and foremost, responsible for protecting its 
citizens. But when national authorities are unwilling or unable to do so, the international 
community, through the Security Council, should be able to act, and must be ready to do so” 
(Annan, 16 May 2005).  
Chapter 1. Introducing Humanitarian Intervention and Responsibility To Protect  
1. 1 Interventionism in the beginning of the 21st century   
At the end of 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi, a 26-years old Tunisian died after setting fire on 
himself. This was an act of desperation of a young man after officials stopped his only source 
of income, selling vegetables and fruits in the street. It sparked demonstrations throughout the 
country and inspired similar protest in several other Arab countries. Poor living conditions, 
high unemployment, corrupted authorities and lack of political freedom, initiated people in 
the Arabic world to take to the streets for demanding political rights and social justice. The 
uprisings, known as the Arab spring, forced several autocratic rulers to leave power and 
prompted democratizations efforts. Though its final ending is yet to be seen, the Arabic world 
has been irrevocably transformed and will certainly not be the same.  
The outcome of the protests took different turns in the region. In Libya, rather than 
abdicating, Gaddafi decided to employ every means possible to hang onto power. There, the 
initially peaceful protests evolved into an armed revolt seeking to topple Gaddafi, causing 
violent clashes between government forces and demonstrators. The United Nations (UN) 
Security Council passed Resolution 1973, authorising member states to take  “all necessary 
measures” to protect the civilians, an action which has been considered to be a clear case for 
when timely and decisive response to an imminent threat of mass murder should happen. 
Within eight months of conflict, the Gaddafi regime came to an end and a democratic 
transition was initiated. Circumstances were comparable at the beginning of the Syrian 
uprising, but the clashes that followed the peaceful protests escalated into a civil war claiming 
thousands of civilian lives. Since the uprising began in March 2011, an immense number of 
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people have been subjected to gross human rights violation in Syria. As the confrontation 
between the governmental forces and the opposition grew in intensity, the country became a 
bloody battlefield causing extreme suffering to the whole Syrian population. Both sides of the 
conflict committed war crimes and gross violations of international human rights laws, 
amounting to crimes against humanity. However the violations and abuses committed by the 
security forces largely surpassed, in scale and intensity, those from the armed opposition. The 
Syrian government clearly failed in its responsibility to protect its own population and at the 
time of writing hundreds of thousands of people have lost their lives in the on-going conflict. 
So far, the international society proved unable to end a conflict that became the direst 
humanitarian emergency of our era. 
The end of the 20th Century witnessed a change in the nature of armed conflicts. 
Large interstate wars became replaced by violent internal conflicts, where the vast majority of 
casualties are civilians. After the tragic events that happened in Rwanda and in the Balkans, a 
profound debate was initiated in the international society on how to react effectively when 
populations are the victims of massive brutality from their own governments. Thus, in the 
decade that immediately followed the cold war, the use of military force for preventing 
humanitarian disasters around the world started to be perceived as interventions for the 
purpose of protecting the human being, which became the so-called humanitarian 
interventions (Kurth, 2005:88). The concept of military intervention for humanitarian purpose 
is a highly contested topic in modern international relations. Recent conflicts show us that a 
grave humanitarian crisis can raise a variable level of reaction from the International Society. 
In some cases, the reaction can lead to a military intervention for protecting civilians suffering 
from the conflict. In other cases, the absence of action permits the crisis to unfold and 
progress. In this introduction I will present some issues related to military intervention for 
humanitarian purpose. I will also introduce the principle of Responsibility to Protect, which is 
an emerging norm in global politics claiming the responsibility of the international society to 
protect populations, when States have failed the duty to protect their citizens. Finally I will 
present the research question and how I will structure my thesis.   
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1.2 Humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty in a developing normative landscape  
The concept of humanitarian intervention is related to different fields including international 
law, political science, international relations and ethics. Different definitions of the concept 
exist (Welsh, 2004:3). For the purpose of my study I will use the definition of Adam Roberts, 
which is “coercive action by one or more states involving the use of armed force in another 
state without the consent of its authorities, and with the purpose of preventing widespread 
suffering or death among the inhabitants” (Roberts, 2000:5). When it involves the use of 
military force without the consent of the target state, humanitarian intervention can become an 
issue for state sovereignty. The principle of state sovereignty, conceptualized in the 
Westphalian state system, gives each state territorial integrity, political independence and 
protection from external intervention. The right of the states to exercise sovereignty within 
their territorial jurisdiction is widely recognised and written in the UN Charter. The principle 
of non-interference protects states against more powerful states and gives each of them the 
essential right to determine its own political system. Each states protection over its own 
people is a principle playing a fundamental role in the elaboration of national sovereignty 
(Bellamy, Davies and Glanville 2011).  
International binding laws have been implemented in the UN system with the purpose 
to prevent and to condemn the perpetration of gross human rights violation. These laws were 
mainly written in the UN Charter, in the Convention on Genocide and in the International Bill 
of Human Rights containing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights both adopted in 
1948, and in the two International Covenant adopted in 1966. The state sovereignty and the 
protection of human rights are both implemented in the international law and a struggle may 
exist between these two principles. Whereas any interference in another state’s internal affairs 
will be viewed as a violation of international law, gross human rights violations perpetrated 
inside a sovereign state constitute also a violation of the same law. “to rescue non-citizens 
facing the extreme is likely to provoke the charge of interference (…) while ‘doing nothing’ 
can lead to accusations of moral indifference” (Wheeler, 2000:1).  
Established in 1945 as an international organisation, the purpose of the United Nations 
is to maintain world peace. In the 1990s, a new norm of UN-authorized humanitarian 
intervention developed. Other unilateral interventions without the authorisation from UN have 
also been accomplished for the purpose of protecting populations, though they have been 
	   6	  
highly debated and have created much of the controversy over humanitarian intervention 
(Wheeler, 2000:8). One example is NATO’s intervention to prevent mass atrocities by the 
Serbs in Kosovo in 1999. At the present time, the UN can authorize the use of force only if 
the permanent members of the Security Council give consent. Thus, if the civilian population 
of a state is exposed to gross violation of human rights, the international society represented 
by the UN can disregard the principle of sovereignty and intervene to end the violence. As 
described in the Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council is being empowered to 
determine the existence of any threat to peace and to legitimate the use of force in order to 
restore international peace and security. Whether massive human rights violations inside state 
borders constitute a legitimate ‘threat to international peace or security’ is debated but, with 
the developing normative landscape of the post-1945 era, such abuses have developed from 
being a matter of concern for domestic jurisdiction to a matter of international concern. 
Relying on the experience of the ad hoc criminal courts of the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, there was a general agreement that an independent, permanent criminal court was 
needed. Thus on 17 July 1998 an international community of 120 states approved the Rome 
Statute, which is the legal basis for establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) and 
which entered into force on 1 July 2002 after ratification by 60 countries. Crimes as genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression, are grave violations of 
international law and perpetrators responsible for such atrocities can be prosecuted and tried 
in ICC. The objective of the ICC is to end the culture of impunity “for the perpetrators of the 
most serious crimes of concern to the international community” (ICC, 2015). Today 123 
countries are State Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 	  
1.3 Responsibility to protect 
During his mandate as General Secretary of the UN, Kofi Annan challenged the Member 
States to establish a political consensus when state sovereignty and the principle of non-
intervention must yield for protection of civilians. Recalling the failures of the Security 
Council to act in a decisive manner in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, he answered back 
to the critics against intervention for humanitarian purposes: “If humanitarian intervention is, 
indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a 
Srebrenica, to gross and systematic violation of human rights that offend every precept of our 
common humanity?” (Annan, 2000:47-48). 
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The origins of RtoP 
In September 2000, the government of Canada established the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). The government of Canada 
announced the set up of the commission in response to the compelling appeal from Kofi 
Annan, about how and when the international society should act toward especially grave 
violations of humanitarian and international law. The ultimate purpose of the ICISS was to 
give a report concerning “when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to take coercive, and in 
particular military action, against another state for the purpose of protecting people at risk at 
that other state” (ICISS, 2001:VII). The report is built on expertise from recognised 
specialists in the field and includes members selected from a variety of backgrounds and 
nations, with the aim of reflecting fairly the perspectives of both developed and developing 
countries (ICISS, 2001:2).  
The term Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) was first mentioned in the report of ICISS, 
presented in December 2001. The concept of RtoP originated from the idea of ‘sovereignty as 
responsibility’, which Francis Deng elaborated based on his former experience on forced 
displacements and international conflicts (Weiss, 2012). Deng asserted that sovereignty is not 
limited to being a protection against foreign interference, but also implies that states are in 
charge of some responsibilities and are held accountable for the welfare of their people 
(Deng, Kimaro, Lyons, Rothchild and Zartman 1996). Accordingly, “when nations do not 
conduct their internal affairs in ways that meet internationally recognized standards, others 
nations not only have the right, but also have a duty, to intervene” (Etzioni, 2005). Deng’s 
arguments are endowed by the ICISS, which affirms as its first principle that “State 
sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its 
people lies with the state itself” (ICISS, 2001:XI). Importantly, the ICISS considers that when 
states fail to fulfil such responsibility, the international society must assist them by using 
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means. But if the state itself violates 
humanitarian and international law, and if the state in question is unwilling to halt such 
violations, the international society must be prepared to take stronger measures, including the 
collective use of force. In these circumstances, the principle of non-intervention must yield to 
the international responsibility to protect. 
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RtoP as a code of conduct for humanitarian intervention   
The implementation of the principle RtoP in the UN system has from its beginning met some 
challenges. Critics have pointed out that “Responsibility to Protect” might be interpreted by 
some states as a “Right to Intervene”, allowing them to abuse the Sovereignty of other states 
under cover of humanitarian intentions. Instead, the ICISS defines military intervention for 
human protection purposes not as a right being offered, but instead as an obligation to act 
when a population is suffering serious harm. “The issue is not the right but rather the 
responsibility of every state to play its appropriate role, with the objective not being 
intervention as such but the protection of men, women and children threatened by the horror 
of mass violence” (Weiss, 2012). Essentially, the ICISS outlines the questions that have to be 
addressed in order to define an appropriate way to act towards humanitarian crisis. These 
include rules, procedures and criteria for determining whether, when and how to intervene. It 
also includes the legitimacy of military intervention, and the mean to establish it successfully 
(ICISS, 2001:11). 
The implementation of RtoP was further challenged by a notable shift in the 
international policy, which after the 11 September focused more toward the protection against 
terrorist activities than on the concerns of genocide and other terrible crimes against the 
humanity. In addition, the controversial invasion of Iraq during the “Operation Iraqi 
Freedom”, contributed to limit support to the principle RtoP (Bellamy, 2005). However, one 
can consider that an important step was made in 2005, when world leaders made a historic 
commitment at the UN World Summit to protect victims from mass atrocities. There, a 
consensus was achieved after revision of the original report presented by the ICISS, resulting 
in the principle of RtoP being adopted and endorsed by the General Assembly (Bellamy, 
2011:9). The following grounds to RtoP were specified, partly meeting the ICISS’s 
considerations:  
- Each individual state carries the primary responsibility for protecting their own population 
from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their 
incitement.  
- The international society has a responsibility to encourage and assist states in fulfilling this 
responsibility. 
- The international society has a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian 
and other peaceful means to protect populations from these crimes. If a state is manifestly 
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failing to protect its populations, the international society must be prepared to take collective 
action, in a timely and decisive manner, to protect populations, in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations, including Chapter VII (Bellamy, 2011:23-24). 
Since then, not only RtoP has become a part of the diplomatic language concerning 
preventions of humanitarian crises, but the need to further implement RtoP within the UN 
system is favourably debated too. The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon challenged the 
UN members to translate their commitment from 2005 in initiatives, a proposal to which the 
General Assembly agreed to give further considerations. Also, despite some reluctance among 
some Security Council members, the Council adopted unanimously resolutions reaffirming 
the commitment to RtoP at the 2005 World Summit (Bellamy, 2010). 
Six criteria for guiding the decision to intervene 
ICISS has throughout its deliberations sought to reconcile the sovereignty of states 
with the principle of RtoP. The principle of non-intervention remains the highest 
consideration in normal circumstances, but must yield to international assistance during 
humanitarian crisis. For this purpose, one has to improve the capacity of international society 
to react decisively when confronted to acts of aggression against populations. Within the 
ICISS, it was generally recognized that crimes, which indisputably “shock the conscience of 
humankind” or present a clear and present danger to international security, must be addressed 
by intervention (ICISS, 2001:31). Intervention can involve the use of force when states are 
either unable or unwilling to carry out their responsibility to protect their own people. By 
consequent, the ICISS attached great importance in developing robust criteria for authorizing 
military intervention to protect human beings.  
Six criteria, based on the experience of previous humanitarian intervention and post-
conflict assistance, were proposed in order to guide decision-making about the use of force. 
According to the different concepts which have been addressed by the ICISS, those criteria 
were named just cause, right authority, right intention, last resort, proportional means and 
reasonable prospect. The proposition to use these criteria for UN decision-making, created 
controversy during the revision of the ICISS report at the 2005 UN World Summit. Several 
African states, the UN High level Panel and Annan endorsed them as essential to making the 
Security Council’s decisions more transparent, accountable to the wider membership and 
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hence legitimate. In contrast, the US, China and Russia opposed them. The “historical 
consensus” between world leaders was in fact achieved only after the rejection of the six 
criteria, among other significant propositions made by the ICISS (Bellamy, 2011:21-24). 
Despite being difficult to implement formally within a UN document, the six criteria 
of the ICISS constitute an essential ground to the application of RtoP. As previously 
mentioned, these criteria were formulated in order to reconcile the obligation of military 
intervention while preserving fundamental sovereignty principles. Therefore, for several 
reasons including not only the legitimacy but also the very success of the operation, the 
concepts carried by these criteria are the ones that matter when a military intervention has to 
be considered. The nature of the six criteria will be extensively developed in the Chapter 2 of 
my thesis. 
1.4 Research question and the structure of the thesis 
Three years after the 2008 economic crisis, humanity experienced a worldwide interrogation 
about the real ability of the international society to act collectively for addressing global 
challenges. Banks, the finance, and other institutions of the global economy were held 
accountable for the major economic shock. The international institutions perceived as 
collective organs working for a better future, such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, were challenged by the self-interest of states. By implementing RtoP, the UN system 
had the possibility to show the world that collective action can prevent the loss of human 
lives. The Libyan crisis of 2011 may have been a demonstration of such capacity, as a legal 
military intervention approved by the UN literally stopped troops on their way to civilian 
targets. Nevertheless, this historical event also revealed deep divergences of attitude within 
the international society, about the use of force for solving humanitarian crises. These 
divergences culminated only some months later, during the Syrian crisis. There, the civilians 
remain assaulted by their own state, in the rumbles of their country. Debates within the 
international society have reached a status quo and so far, none of its actions really permitted 
to prevent gross violations of human right.  
Differences in the outcomes of these conflicts raise questions about the conditions 
permitting to translate the principles enounced in the RtoP into an action purposed for human 
protection. In other words:  
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“With regards to the responsibility of the international society to protect people from mass 
atrocities, what are the conditions that actually permit to deploy a military intervention for 
human protection purposes?”  
My master thesis is a comparative analysis where Libya and Syria will be presented as two 
specific cases with different outcomes concerning military intervention. I will first present the 
empirical material of the Syrian and the Libyans crisis that are relevant for the principle of 
RtoP. I will then consider this information under the six criteria set out by the ICISS for 
guiding decisions concerning military intervention. These criteria constitute the theoretical 
framework of my thesis.	  
Chapter 2. The Theoretical Framework 
In the previous chapter, I briefly mentioned that military intervention for humanitarian 
purposes poses legal issues, chiefly regarding state sovereignty and legitimacy. Accordingly, 
a military intervention will be considered relevant not only if it demonstrates the capacity to 
solve a serious humanitarian situation, but also if its objective is uniquely focused on 
addressing the humanitarian crisis. Therefore, a properly designed military intervention 
includes all the factors that promote a better outcome both in terms of humanitarian protection 
and international acknowledgement. The ICISS describes the RtoP as a set of interrelated 
responsibilities towards suffering populations, which are to prevent, to react, to rebuild. 
These responsibilities will be outlined, before I examine the guidelines criteria set out by the 
ICISS to validate military intervention for humanitarian purpose. 
2.1 To prevent, to react, to rebuild  
The responsibility to prevent is stressed by the ICISS as the most important dimension of 
RtoP (ICISS, 2001:XI). Military intervention can be perceived by some as an uncomplicated 
tool used to address complex crises, in this way acting like a police authority more busy 
chasing bandits than solving the causes of crime. In reality, resources devoted to preventing 
deadly conflicts are scarcer than resources devoted to coercive intervention including military 
intervention, post-intervention construction and peace keeping. Therefore, the ICISS 
prioritizes the preventive aspect of RtoP, which includes assistance aiming at long-term 
political and economical stabilization. Failure to prevent a conflict can have grave 
	   12	  
international consequences, and for this reason the whole international society should 
contribute to the resources devoted to identify the root causes of crises. A broader inclusion of 
the international society in the prevention efforts can help to legitimate international action, 
especially in the cases where coercive measures have to be taken. Both the General Assembly 
and the Security Council have adopted resolutions recognising the vital role of all parts of the 
UN system in conflict prevention and pledging to enhance their effectiveness (ICISS, 
2001:19). 
The root causes of a conflict putting populations at risk can be addressed with 
measures benefiting various social and political infrastructures such as democratic 
institutions, the rule of law, economical opportunities, education and reform of the military 
system (ICISS, 2001:23). “Every step taken toward reducing poverty and achieving broad-
based economic growth, is a step toward conflict prevention” Kofi Annan alleged in his 
Millennium Report (ICISS, 2001:22). Such approach meet both the perspectives of the Article 
55 of the UN Charter and those of the Security Council itself, which also stress the 
importance of prevention as a necessary measure for stability and peaceful relations among 
nations. The ambitions of RtoP are thus directly linked to the UN charter, which “provides the 
foundations for a comprehensive and long-term approach to conflict prevention based on an 
expanded concept of peace and security” (ICISS, 2001:22). The direct causes of a conflict are 
generally prevented using the same kind of measures as the one for root cause prevention, but 
they are deployed with short-term instruments, which can be either of coercive nature or 
involving diplomacy. 
When preventive measures have failed and if the state in question is unable or 
unwilling to solve a conflict causing human suffering, the responsibility to protect implies the 
responsibility to react. Such responsibility implies the duty to respond to situations of 
compelling human needs with appropriate measures, which may include coercive ones like 
sanctions, international prosecution and, in extreme cases, military intervention. Here, the 
ICISS highlights the importance to always consider the least intrusive and coercive measures 
first. Whereas sanctions can reduce a state's capacity to interact with others, they do not 
necessarily prevent it from carrying out actions within its borders. Military intervention on the 
opposite directly interferes with the capacity of a domestic authority to operate on its own 
territory. It effectively displaces the domestic authority and aims to address directly the 
particular problem or threat that has arisen. For these reasons, and because of the inherent 
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risks linked to the use of force, the prospect of military action has always raised broader and 
more intense concerns than has the imposition of sanctions (ICISS, 2001:29).  However, non-
military measure must also be used with extreme care as they can do more harm than good. 
This applies especially to civilians, as sanctions may be effectively indiscriminate in nature. 
In order to focus the impact of sanctions on the decision makers of a country, sanctions must 
be considered within three distinct areas, which are military, economic and 
political/diplomatic. In all three areas, effective monitoring is crucial for the effectiveness of 
the sanctions and for avoiding their negative impacts on innocent populations (ICISS, 
2001:30).  
Lastly, the responsibility to protect implies the responsibility to follow trough and 
rebuild. It means to provide assistance and reconciliation following a crisis, particularly after 
a military intervention. The commitment to rebuild a country after a military intervention is 
pivotal to promote durable peace, good governance and sustainable development (ICISS, 
2001:39). Under such perspective, rebuilding holds an important preventive aspect, since it 
will aim at eventually solving the causes of the harm the intervention was initially designed to 
halt or avert.  
2.2 Military Intervention and the guiding criteria 
The just cause  
According to the ICISS, military intervention for humanitarian purpose can be justified if 
either or both of the following conditions are satisfied: 
“ - Large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocide intent or not, which 
is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a 
failed state situation.  
   - Large scale “ethnic cleansing”, actual or apprehended, whether carried out by 
killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape” (ICISS, 2001:32).  
The ICISS affirms that these two conditions necessarily include a variety of conscience-
shocking situations that similarly happened in past humanitarian crises, defined for example 
in the framework of the 1948 Genocide Convention and in the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocols. These conditions also include “overwhelming natural or environmental 
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catastrophes, where the state concerned is either unwilling or unable to cope, or call for 
assistance, and significant loss of life is occurring or threatened” (ICISS 2001:33). 
For the ICISS the term “large-scale” has to be considered qualitatively and cannot 
correspond to an arbitrary measure. The military action can be legitimate as an anticipatory 
measure in response to clear evidence of likely large-scale killing. “Without (…) anticipatory 
action, the international community would be placed in the morally untenable position of 
being required to wait until genocide begins, before being able to take action to stop it” 
(ICISS, 2001:33). According to Weiss, the conditions required by the ICISS are not 
completely satisfactory in terms of RtoP as they are setting the bar too high. Weiss argued 
that the ICISS recommendations fall short of the 1998 Statute of the ICC, whose ‘crimes 
against humanity’ includes various situations where great suffering is intentionally caused, 
ranging from murder and slavery to imprisonment (Weiss, 2004). 
The right authority 
 
The ICISS devotes a whole chapter on the authority which can approve a military intervention 
for human protection purposes. Collective intervention blessed by the UN is regarded as 
legitimate because it is duly authorized by a representative international body. For the same 
reason, unilateral intervention not approved by the UN can be seen as illegitimate. 
Indisputably, the Security Council is the most appropriate body for dealing with such issue.  
The practical performance of the Security Council in addressing humanitarian crises 
with military intervention is generally dissatisfying and reveals fundamental issues 
concerning the functioning of the institution. Indeed, it remains debated whether the Security 
Council can act as a supreme authority regarding international crises, especially with regards 
to its unrepresentative membership and the double standards associated with the permanent 
members. In addition, the decision-making process of the Security Council is generally 
regarded as giving inconsistent results, as the veto power is likely “to be the principal obstacle 
to effective international action in cases where quick and decisive action is needed to stop or 
avert a significant humanitarian crisis” (ICISS, 2001:51). In spite of these concerns, there is 
presently no more appropriate institution than the Security Council to authorize military 
intervention for humanitarian purpose. Because of its relative neutrality, the Security Council 
is the only legitimate body that can override state sovereignty. Therefore, a main approach for 
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making international reaction more efficient towards humanitarian crises would be to improve 
how the Security Council is working (ICISS, 2001:49).  
In matters of grave concerns, it seems absurd that one veto from a member of the 
Security Council can override the position of the rest of the humanity. Hence, the ICISS 
questions the ability of the Security Council as being the only organ to cope with military 
intervention for the protection of human beings: 
“if the Security Council expressly rejects a proposal for intervention where 
humanitarian or human rights issues are significantly at stake, or (…) fails to deal with 
such a proposal within a reasonable time, it is difficult to argue that alternative means 
of discharging the responsibility to protect can be entirely discounted” (ICISS, 
2001:53).  
The ICISS propose two alternatives, in order to valid a military intervention not authorized by 
the Security Council: 
1) To seek support for military action from the General Assembly by meeting in an 
Emergency Special Session under special procedures previously established. On 3 November 
1950, the resolution 377 A (V) adopted by the General Assembly was given the title “Uniting 
for Peace”. “Uniting for Peace” was crafted as a tool to avoid further USSR vetoes in the 
Security Council during the Korean War:  
“If the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, 
fails to exercise its primary responsibility (…) the General Assembly shall consider 
the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to 
Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act 
of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security (…). Moreover, such “emergency special session may 
be called if requested by the Security Council (…) or by a majority of the Members of 
the United Nations” (Security Council, 2013).  
Several countries, during the consultations of the ICISS, expressed their support for 
procedures similar to “Uniting for Peace”. Although the General Assembly lacks the power to 
enforce a military intervention directly, a decision in favour of action supported by an 
overwhelming majority of member states at the General Assembly would provide a high 
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degree of legitimacy for an intervention. Indeed, the measures adopted under “Uniting for 
Peace” procedures benefit from strong moral and political support, as they require the two-
third majority in the General Assembly. Military intervention endorsed by the General 
Assembly in such circumstances could encourage the Security Council to rethink its position 
(ICISS, 2001:53).   
2) Collective military intervention could be pursued by regional or sub-regional organization. 
Neighbouring states have a strong interest in solving the negative spill over effects usually 
associated with humanitarian crises, such as mass flow of refugees or the use of their territory 
as base by rebel groups. According to the ICISS, neighbouring states can thus engage 
efficiently for protecting human beings and stabilizing a country:  
“It has long been acknowledged that neighbouring states acting within the framework 
of regional or sub-regional organizations are often better placed to act than the UN, 
and Article 52 of the Charter has been interpreted as giving them considerable 
flexibility in this respect” (ICISS, 2001:53).  
The Right Intention 
“The primary purpose of the intervention must be to halt or avert human suffering” (ICISS, 
2001:35). In reality, motives beyond humanitarian assistance can also drive the engagement 
or not into military intervention. Mixed motives are a well-known fact in international 
relations. National interest in terms of geopolitical opportunities, but also cultural influence 
and past relationships can motive a state to participate in a military intervention against 
another one. Alternatively, the cost of participating to coercive measures (loss of soldiers, the 
expenditures) can significantly contribute to the reluctance of some states to assist others. 
However, these classical considerations are now evolving in a globalised and interdependent 
world, where crises in faraway and little-known countries can generate major problems 
elsewhere, such as refugee outflow, pandemics, terrorism and organized crime. “It is strongly 
arguable that it is in every country’s interest to contribute cooperatively to the resolution of 
such problems, quite apart from the humanitarian imperative to do so” (ICISS, 2001:36). 
Even though the absence of any narrow self-interest remains an ideal in international affairs, 
the right intention is better assured when military operations are carried out multilateral, 
clearly supported by regional opinion and by the victims concerned. 
	   17	  
 A regime overthrow cannot be the legitimate objective of a military intervention for 
humanitarian purpose. However, the ICISS stresses that disabling the regime’s capacity to 
harm its own people may be essential to discharging the mandate to protection. The necessary 
means to achieve such disabling may vary from case to case. Occupation of territory may not 
be avoided, but it should not be an objective in itself. In such eventuality, there should be 
clear commitment from the outset to return the territory to its sovereign owner at the 
conclusion of hostilities or, in the absence of a legitimate owner, administering it on an 
interim basis under UN auspices (ICISS, 2001:35).   
Last resort 
“Military intervention can only be justified when every non-military option from the 
prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored, with reasonable grounds for 
believing lesser measures would not have succeeded” (ICISS, 2001:XII). The ICISS 
emphases that all diplomatic and non-military options must have been explored before 
military intervention can be justified. It does not mean that each of these options must 
precisely be tried and failed, as often the emergency of humanitarian crises offers no time for 
working out a systematic process. However, non-military options must yield when there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that if the measures had been attempted they would not have 
succeeded. Additionally, if the crisis involves a conflict of a state party and an insurgent 
minority, the parties must be induced to negotiate. Ceasefires, followed by the deployment of 
international peacekeepers and observers, are always a better option than coercive military 
responses (ICISS, 2001:36).   
Proportional means 
“The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the minimum 
necessary to secure the defined human protection objective” (ICISS, 2001:XII). The means of 
the coercive action need to be proportionate with the ends and in line with the magnitude of 
the original provocation. Also in agreement with the Right Intention criteria, the effect on the 
political system of the country targeted should be limited to what is strictly necessary to 
accomplish the purpose of the intervention. In case the coercive actions implies military force, 
all rules of humanitarian law should be strictly observed and high standard of international 
monitoring should be applied (ICISS, 2001:37).  
	   18	  
Reasonable prospects 
“There must be a reasonable chance of success in halting or averting the suffering, which has 
justified the intervention, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the 
consequences of inaction” (ICISS, 2001:XII). Military intervention is not justified if actual 
protection cannot be achieved, or if the consequences of embarking upon the intervention are 
likely to be worse than if there is no action at all. The responsibility to respond to a 
humanitarian crisis should be pondered by the risks of escaping control after the military 
intervention took place. Such risks include triggering a larger conflict within the assisted 
country or within the region, with negative consequences on populations (ICISS, 2001:37).	  
Chapter 3. Methodology  
In order to better understand the conditions that permit a military intervention for 
humanitarian purpose, I will put the theoretical framework in the context of the Libyan and 
Syrian crises. These two cases will be analysed separately, and for each I will expose the facts 
that are relevant to the six criteria of the ICISS. The aim is to see were the cases differ along 
these six criteria and thus identify which criteria are pivotal in ensuring the differing outcome. 
Before explaining the methodology supporting my research design, I will present a brief 
definition of a case study. 
3.1 Case study 
According to Yin, a case study is defined as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2009:18). 
Humanitarian interventions are phenomenon that cannot be easily distinguished from context 
in real-life, and case study represents there the most relevant method of investigation. 
According to Stakes, the crucial point in case study research is the object of study itself: “As a 
form of research, case study is defined by interest in individual cases, not by the methods of 
inquiry used” (Stake, 1994:236). In my research, the Syrian and Libyan conflicts are 
individual cases, constituting two units of analysis that will be compared. These cases are 
going to be scrutinized in the theoretical context of RtoP and I expect to pinpoint the key 
	   19	  
conditions leading to a military intervention for humanitarian purpose. Accordingly, the 
present research can be defined as an instrumental case study and thus differs from an 
intrinsic case study: “In (…) instrumental case studies, a particular case is examined to 
provide insight into an issue or refinement of theory. The case is of secondary interest; it 
plays a supportive role, facilitating our understanding of something else” (Stake, 1994: 237). 	  
3.2 Research design 
“Research design (…) guides the investigator in the process of collection, analysing 
and interpreting observations. It is a logical model of proof that allows the researcher 
to draw inferences concerning causal relations among the variables under 
investigation” (Nachmias & Nachmias, 1992:77-78).  
Comparative design is commonly used in comparative politics and is traditionally based on 
cross culture comparison of two or more countries, either by choosing a qualitative- or a 
quantitative research strategy (Ringdal, 2007:150). The comparative design is built on an 
analysis of few or many numbers of units, on a macro- (countries, organisations etc.) or micro 
level (persons). Unlike variable-oriented analysis, which aims for instance at describing one 
unit under several aspects, the case-oriented comparative analysis seeks out to establish 
connections between different aspects present within each unit. These different aspects 
constitute independent variables. Two strategies exist when setting up a comparative design. 
The first, named most similar system, is a comparative analysis of similar cases. Here the 
independent variables are mostly similar among the cases being compared, while the 
fundamental difference between the cases is the final outcome, also named dependent 
variable. In such system, only some few conditions can explain the different outcome. There 
is a difference with the second strategy, called the most dissimilar system, in which the 
comparative analysis will emphasize similarity in the final outcome of the case whereas 
independent variables will be mostly dissimilar. My research design is a most similar system, 
with the following characteristics:  
1) Independent variables are the six criteria of the ICISS  
2) The units being compared are Libya and Syria, with two distinct final outcomes regarding 
the dependent variable, which is “Military intervention for humanitarian purpose”. 
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3.3 Data source  
My thesis is based on secondary data available in reports from different international 
humanitarian organizations. Libya and Syria are major regional players in the Middle East, 
and a large amount of general information regarding history, politics and socio-economic 
profile is publicly available. The media coverage used in this thesis includes international 
news reports from the period following the “Arab Spring”. First, I have used these sources for 
describing the conflicts in Syria and Libya in a relevant way, focusing on the chain of events 
that led to situations of humanitarian crisis. Second, the development of these conflicts has 
been scrutinized under the perspective of RtoP and ICISS criteria, in order to appreciate 
whether they justify military intervention. The conclusions of this study will be discussed and 
confronted to relevant works in comparative politics.   
3.3.1 Data availability for Syria  
Due to the grave deterioration of the human rights situation that emerged early during the 
Syrian crisis the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) decided to establish an independent 
international Commission of inquiry on Syria (IICISyria). From August 2011, the IICISyria 
has published nine reports, the latest 5 February 2015, documenting gross human rights 
violations constituting crimes against humanity and war crimes perpetrated throughout the 
country since March 2011 (OHCHR, 2014).  
With the mandate to chart violations on international human rights and humanitarian 
law perpetrated in Syria, the IICISyria needed to act as a fact-finding body. The investigation 
relied primarily on first-hand accounts based on interviews, with a total number of 3.550 
since the interviewing process began in Geneva September 2011 (IICISyria, 5 February 
2015). Victims and witnesses of gross violations of human rights in Syria; including 
personnel defected from the military and security forces, have been interviewed. The Syrian 
authorities having denied IICISyria access to the country, the persons interviewed were either 
present outside Syria - mainly in hospitals or refugee camps, or were contacted inside the 
country by using phone and webcams. The documents of the IICISyria also include 
photographs, video recordings, satellite imagery and medical and forensic reports. Sources 
from governmental (regional organisations like the League of Arabs States and the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation and member states from all regional groups) and non-
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governmental organizations (NGOs), media accounts and academic analyses have also been 
used to help the IICISyria implement its mandate (IICISyria, 2011: 5). 
For my thesis the reports from the IICISyria are representing one of the most reliable 
sources on the political and humanitarian situation in Syria. Reports from major NGOs such 
as Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW), media accounts and other 
UN sources provide also key elements for understanding the Syrian crisis. 
3.3.2 Data availability for Libya 
Condemning the human rights violations committed during demonstrations in Libya, the 
UNHRC decided on 25 February 2011, to dispatch an independent international commission 
of inquiry on Libya (IICILibya) (IICILibya, 2011:2). The IICILibya has published two 
documents reporting crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by both 
governmental and rebel forces. The first report was presented on 1 June 2011. The 
IICILybia's investigation was not interrupted during the ongoing civil war, and it presented 
the second report on 8 March 2012. These reports constitute my main data as they give 
reliable accounts of the political events that unfolded before in Libya immediately prior the 
military intervention was decided. Additional sources include HRW, AI, media coverage and 
official information from the UN.  
The IICILibya established direct contact with the Libyan authorities and the interim 
government, the National Transitional Council (NTC), together with representatives from the 
civil society. During its field missions the IICILibya interviewed over 350 people, including 
doctors, medical staff, patients and their relatives, detainees and displaced persons, either 
inside Libya or in transit points or refugee camps outside. The IICILibya relied on first-hand 
accounts, field observations and a large number of reports and documents were studied. In 
addition, more than 580 videos and over 2200 photographs were examined (IICILibya, 
2011:2).	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Chapter 4. The Syrian and Libyan Crises (2011-2015)   
4.1 The modern Syria: From dictatorship to civil war   
 
Figure 1: Political map of the Syrian Arab Republic. 
Until Syria became an independent state in 1946 it has remained under the control of different 
empires. The Ottomans ruled Syria from 1515 to 1918. After the defeat and the collapse of 
the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, Syria became a territory under French 
mandate. The partition of the Ottoman Empire, included in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 
October 1916, was a result of secret discussions between British and French diplomats, Sir 
Mark Sykes and Charles Francois Georges Picot. A new map of the Middle East became a 
reality, with Syria and Lebanon as well handed over to the control of France (Rogan, 2011). 
By doing so, the French had secured their interest in the Middle East. Further control over 
territory, mandated by France, was achieved by conducting a divide-and-conquer strategy, 
splitting the territory into six regions based on the religion of their inhabitants. The French 
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cooperated with the powerful Sunni Muslims families and isolated minority groups like Alawi 
and Druze (Waage, 2013:254-255). Throughout its history, different ethnical and religious 
groups have settled down in Syria. Today, 90.3 per cent of the populations are Arabs; the 
remainder comprises Kurds, Armenians and others ethnicities. The main religion is Islam, 
with the two major groups being the Sunni (74 per cent of the Syrian population) and the Shia 
(13 per cent). The Alawi sect, which the al-Assad family belongs to, is a branch of Shia Islam. 
Others religious groups includes Druze, Jewish and Christian (CIA Factbook 2014).     
During the first decades after the independence of 1946, the political life in Syria was 
marked by several coups and the rise of the Ba’ath Party. The Ba’ath party, established in the 
beginning of the 1940s, has the ambition to create a secular, pan-Arabic nation founded on 
socialism and Arabic values (“Ba’ath” means renaissance) (Rogan, 2011:354). Hafiz al-
Assad, an ambitious officer who joined the Ba’ath party from an early age, became a 
prominent figure among the Alawi. Political instability increased in 1967 after the defeat of 
Syria in the Israeli-Arab war and the loss of the Golan Heights. From there, Hafiz al-Assad 
expanded his political influence and seized power in a bloodless coup in 1970 (Waage, 
2013:267-269). Hafiz al-Assad established an authoritarian regime, where politics and the 
military came under his absolute control. Alawites were given prestigious positions in every 
sector of political life. A large number of security agencies were created with the purpose to 
monitor political dissent. The military and security forces were expanded massively, ready to 
crack down on whatever critic of the regime. The opponents were subjected to torture and 
detention long prison sentences. Even though political stability was brought to the country, 
Syria was ruled with a rod of iron until Hafiz al-Assad’s death in 2000 (Waage, 2013:269).   
Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father and brought new hope to the opposition by 
promising modernization of the regime. Under his father’s rule, political opposition was 
almost impossible. Since 1963 the conflict with Israel was an excuse for an enduring State of 
emergency, offering absolute power to the president and continuing extensive repression of 
political dissent. Bashar al-Assad initiated democratic reforms like the right to assembly and 
freedom of speech often referred to as the “Damascus Spring”, but only for a brief period. 
Bashar tolerance came to an end only a year after his succession. Officially justified on the 
grounds that the reformist movement was destabilizing the country, opposition leaders were 
soon arrested and crackdown imposed on the civil society (Selvik, Stenslie, 2007). Decades of 
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tight control on freedom of expression during the rule of al-Assad father and son have limited 
the political life and the constitution of an independent civil society. 
4.1.1 The brutal crackdown of the Syrian uprising in 2011 
”Our commanding officer told us that there were armed conspirators and terrorists 
attacking civilians and burning Government buildings. We went into Telbisa on that 
day. We did not see any armed group. The protestors called for freedom. They carried 
olive branches and marched with their children. We were ordered to either disperse the 
crowd or eliminate everybody, including children. (…) We opened fire; I was there. 
We used machine guns and other weapons. There were many people on the ground, 
injured or killed” (IICISyria, 23 November 2011:11). 
In the beginning of February 2011, inspired by the Arabic spring movements small protests 
concerning freedom of expression, corruption, poverty, democratic rights and the release of 
political prisoners erupted in Syria. In mid-March, a large demonstration broke out in the 
south west, in Daraa, after the detention and torture of a group of children accused of painting 
anti-government slogans on public buildings. Showing support to Daraa, demonstrations 
spread rapidly to other cities in the country and developed into a nation-wide movement after 
the government forces used excessive force against people, including shooting 
indiscriminately into peaceful crowds (IICISyria, 23 November 2011:8).   
The Syrian regime responded with more and more brutal violence to the peaceful 
demonstrations and in an effort to supress the unrest, large-scale military operations have 
been launched nation-wide. Security and military forces operating together with the shabiha, a 
state-sponsored militia, subjected the civilians to unprecedented fear, including extrajudicial 
and summary killings, torture and sexual violence. Snipers hired by the security forces shot 
many unarmed civilians who were participating in demonstrations and even during funerals 
processions. Posted at strategic points, snipers and the shabiha terrorized the populations, 
targeting and killing children, women and unarmed civilians. The brutal crackdown caused 
numerous innocent deaths and the first report of the IICISyria confirmed that the majority of 
the civilians were killed in the context of peaceful demonstrations. On numerous occasions, 
defectors from the government forces reported about the execution of comrades who refused 
to open fire at civilians. On 25 April 2011 in Daraa, conscripts refused to follow an order to 
fire into a residential area. The soldiers, who chose to fire in the air instead at the civilians, 
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got immediately shot and killed by the security forces posted behind them (IICISyria, 23 
November 2011:10-11). Evidence exist that commanders in government forces ordered their 
subordinates to shoot civilians and hors de combat fighters, and to torture and mistreat 
detainees (IICISyria, 22 February 2012:22).  
In summer 2011, peaceful protestors took up arms together with defectors from 
military and security forces and organized themselves into the Free Syrian Army (FSA) 
(IICISyria, 23 November 2011:8). The FSA began attacking the government forces in order 
first to end the widespread attacks on civilians, then to force Assad to leave the power. The 
clashes between the government forces and the FSA intensified early November 2011, 
particularly in the areas of Homs, Hama, Rif Dimashg and Idlib governorates (IICISyria, 22 
February 2012:10). By mid-July 2012 the International Committee of Red Cross said the 
conflict had escalated into a full-scale civil war (BBC, 15 July 2012). The intensity of the 
fighting caused vast casualties among the civilians as a consequence of use of heavy artillery, 
indiscriminate air strikes, mortar attacks and bombings (IICISyria, 16 August 2012). The 
government forces decided not to spare anyone in their fight against the opposition, and no 
place could be considered a safe haven for the population. Heavy shelling into densely 
populated neighbourhoods with no warning to the population and with no chance to escape 
caused numerous victims, including many children. Several areas were bombarded and then 
stormed by the government forces arresting, torturing and executing suspected defectors and 
opposition activists (IICISyria, 22 February 2012:10-11). Torture, arbitrary detention, 
enforced disappearance, sexual torture and other forms of ill- treatment became common 
across the country, targeting children and women as well. Reports from the IICISyria include 
horrific testimonies of people being subjected to grotesque torture. Children were arrested and 
detained arbitrarily, put in overcrowded cell together with adults and exposed to grotesque 
torture, which sometimes caused death (IICISyria, 23 November 2011: 13-14). Rape was 
perpetrated against men, women and children, sometimes in front of their family. Moral 
abuses were also committed, for instance women forced to walk naked in the streets 
(IICISyria, 16 August 2012:18). Hospitals and detention centres were transformed into torture 
chambers, with the medical staff sometimes coerced to operate with the security forces. 
Seriously injured patients were chained to their beds, where they were electrocuted, beaten at 
their wounded parts of their body and denied medical support, water etc. (IICISyria, 22 
February 2012:14).  
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The IICISyria has received credible and consistent accounts from the victims and 
witnesses, of where torture took place and which methods were being used. In the second 
report of the IICISyria published February 2012, a list of 38 detention locations in 12 cities is 
annexed, documenting cases of torture since March 2011 (IICISyria, 22 February 2012:Annex 
XIII). The UK-based human rights organisation, Syrian Observatory of Human Rights 
(SOHR), claimed in March 2015 that nearly 13.000 Syrians, including 108 children have been 
tortured to death since the uprising in March 2011. This has been taking place in several 
detentions centres operated by the government. In addition, the death toll does not include 
more than 20000 detainees who are still missing and whose fate remains unknown (SOHR, 
2015).  
4.1.2 Crimes against humanity and war crimes documented early on during the Syrian 
conflict 
Crimes against humanity, when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
against civilians, are according to article 7 of the Rome Statute defined as acts such as 
murder, unlawful imprisonment, enforced disappearance, torture and rape (Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, 2002). By November 2011, the Office of the High 
Commissioner of Human Rights estimated that the government forces of Syria had killed at 
least 3.500 civilians since March 2011, and participated to thousands being tortured and 
arbitrary arrested (IICISyria, 23 November 2011:8). Published on 23 November 2011, the 
first report of the IICISyria concludes that government forces have committed crimes against 
humanity in Syria since the uprising in March 2011 (IICISyria, 23 November 2011:18). 
Moreover: 
“The scale of these attacks against civilians in cities and villages across the country, 
their repetitive nature, the levels of excessive force used consistently by units of the 
armed forces and diverse security forces, the coordinated nature of these attacks and 
the evidence that many attacks were conducted on the orders of high-ranking military 
officers all lead the commission to conclude that the attacks were apparently 
conducted pursuant to a policy of the State” (IICISyria, 23 November 2011:19).  
In its third report, published on 16 August 2012, the IICISyria recognised that both opponents 
of the conflict have committed crimes constituting war crimes. War crimes are grave breaches 
of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and according to the article 8 of the Rome 
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Statute such crimes are defined as being part of a plan or a large-scale commission, 
encompassing crimes such as deliberate killings, indiscriminate attacks, torture and inhuman 
treatment, destruction of property and taking of hostages etc. (Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal court, 2002).  
The FSA undertook initially a defensive posture but later on, carried out offensive 
operations that subjected civilians to gross human rights violations (IICISyria, 22 February 
2012:21). As the conflict escalated, several new anti-government groups emerged out of 
control from the FSA. The IICISyria has since concluded that these groups have committed 
war crimes and crimes against humanity. However, the violations and abuses committed by 
the armed opposition did not reach the gravity, frequency and scale of those committed by 
government forces and the shabiha (IICISyria, 16 August 2012). The Syrian Arab Republic 
has signed the Rome Statute of the ICC, but has not ratified it. In this case only the UN 
Security Council can, by referring the situation in Syria to the ICC, give the court the 
jurisdiction to investigate and possibly prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity 
committed by all sides in the Syrian conflict. However, on 22 May 2014, a UN resolution that 
would have referred the situation in Syria to the ICC was vetoed by the two permanent 
members Russia and China (UN News Centre, 2014).  
4.1.3 Large-scale attacks against civilians  
The armed opposition against the Syrian regime succeeded in taking control over several 
cities or districts of big cities. There are several indications that the Syrian regime has been 
using siege warfare in order to take back the control of the urban areas and to minimize 
casualties in its troops. During these military operations, the Syrian regime committed war 
crimes and crime against humanity by using indiscriminate aerial and artillery attacks on 
densely populated areas. The nature of these aggressions demonstrates clearly that the Syrian 
government is leading a large-scale aggression towards its own citizens.  
The use of barrel bombs, carried out by the Syrian regime against opposition-held 
areas was first documented in August 2012 in Homs city and al-Qusayr in Homs governorate 
(IICISyria, 12 February 2014:50). Barrel bombs are cheap warfare devices consisting of large 
containers filled with explosives, scrap metal and frequently with incendiary material, with 
the purpose to increase their lethal effect. They are dropped from helicopters at high altitude 
	   28	  
in order to avoid anti-aircraft fire, which makes impossible their precise use against military 
targets. Barrel bombs have had a devastating impact on the population, killing and injuring 
thousands. The attacks have been carried out in densely populated areas, causing extreme 
suffering and mass displacement of civilians.  
“Government forces have systematically targeted civilians and civilian infrastructure, 
demonstrating the intent to kill, wound and maim (...) The apparent objective of the 
Government’s military operations is to render life unbearable in areas out of its control 
(…) The timing and duration of the attacks, the choice of weapons and the locations 
targeted, such as markets, intersections, schools and hospitals, demonstrate intent to 
cause maximum civilian casualties” (IICISyria, 13 August 2014:16).  
The use of barrel bombs is prohibited under international law given their indiscriminate 
nature and wide-area effect when used over densely populated areas. The UN Security 
Council resolution 2139 was passed unanimously on the 22 February 2014, inter alia 
condemning the indiscriminate use of barrel bombs. The Syrian regime ignored the resolution 
and proceeded with the bombings. The international society has since done nothing to hold 
the perpetrators of continued barrel bombs attacks to account. The use of barrel bombs has in 
fact escalated during the conflict. From 22 February 2014 until 25 January 2015 HRW has 
documented at least 450 places in Daraa and more than 1.000 places in Aleppo, which have 
been targeted by barrel bombs and other air-dropped munitions. Doctors interviewed by the 
HRW asserted that women and children make up the majority of the victims and that “the 
injuries were predominately fragmentation wounds from explosive weapons” (HRW, 24 
February 2015). The vast majority of fatalities caused by barrel bomb attacks have been 
civilians. According to AI, 12.194 people were killed in Syria from 2012 until February 2015 
as a result of barrel bomb attacks by government forces. Only 473 of these people were 
fighters. More than half were killed after the adoption of the resolution 2139 (AI, 2015:20).  
Syrian security forces often run ground assaults without consideration for civilians. 
On 25 May 2012, the civilians in the village of Taldou, in the region of Houla in Homs 
governorate, were exposed to a terrible massacre. Heavy shelling took place before the 
government forces and the shabiha started to break into the houses and killing anyone they 
could find, without exception. Entire families were executed and more than 100 Syrians, 
including 49 children and 34 women, were killed that day (The Guardian, 1 June 2012). 
Houla, mainly populated by Sunni, is surrounded by Alawite and Shia villages and tensions 
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between these communities were reported. The IICISyria concluded that government forces 
together with shabiha were the perpetrators of the massacre, and that the killing was 
deliberate and part of the ongoing armed conflict (IICISyria, 16 August 2012:10-11). On 
similar circumstances, more than 200 Syrians were massacred in Tremesh, near Hama on the 
12 July 2012. The UN monitoring mission deployed in Syria said they witnessed helicopters 
and tanks shelling Tremesh and that the Syrian air force took a lead role in the assault (The 
Guardian, 15 July 2012). After the start of the civil war an increasing number of similar 
massacres have been reported in Syria.  
Three years after the uprising, more than a quarter of a million civilians are besieged 
in Syria according to the seventh report published by the IICISyria (IICISyria, 2014). “Slow 
Death”, a report released in March 2015 by the Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS), 
claims that at least 640.200 Syrians are living in areas under long-term sieges, some since 
2012 (SAMS, 2015). The plights of the besieged civilians are devastating as they are trapped 
inside the cities and being denied humanitarian aid, water, food and medical care. This 
situation caused hundreds of deaths, adding to the victims of shelling and bombardments. 
According to a report published by AI, 194 civilians died in Yarmouk (a Palestinian refugee 
camp located in Damascus), during the tightening of the siege between July 2013 and 22 
February 2014. 128 people died from starvation and 51 from illnesses requiring medical care 
(AI, 2014:9). Between 17.000 and 20.000 civilians are trapped in Yarmouk, being forced to 
eat cats, dogs and leaves, and exposing themselves to government forces while searching for 
food. A father grieving over the death of his son said: “You died for the sake of bringing 
hibiscus leaves for your brothers and sisters” (AI, 2014:11). Starvation as warfare is 
considered as a war crime.  
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Figure 2: Breakdown of siege victims by age. The dataset was obtained during a medical 
study of siege victims, by collection of 560 documented deaths during siege in Damascus 
(506), Homs (26), Aleppo (22), Deir Ezzor (4), Hama (2).	  
4.1.4	  Use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  
On 21 August 2013, chemical weapon attacks in opposition-controlled suburbs of Damascus 
(Eastern and Western Ghouta) killed hundreds of civilians, including a large number of 
children (HRW, 2013). The Syrian regime immediately denied any responsibility and blamed 
the opposition. An investigation led by HRW together with arms experts, clearly shown that 
government forces carried out the attacks. Several evidences support these allegations, such as 
the coordinated nature of the attacks and the presence of government-controlled potential 
rocket launching sites within range of the targets. The rockets used, which are specially 
designed for delivering nerve agent as sarin, are documented in the stockpile of the Syrian 
Army and videos showed government forces firing them during the on-going conflict. HRW 
showed that the Syrian opposition forces are not in possession of such rockets and their firing 
systems. A UN team, with the mandate to investigate allegations of the use of chemical 
weapons in Syria, confirmed in its report that chemical weapons, specifically sarin, had been 
used in several incidents during the conflict (UN Mission on Chemical Weapons in Syria, 13 
September 2013). The UN mandate is limited to establish whether chemical attack actually 
took place, and therefore the perpetrators of these horrific crimes are left with impunity. The 
use of chemical weapons is a grave violation of international law, specific under customary 
international humanitarian law and is constituted as a war crime under the Rome Statute.  
Two years after President Bashar al-Assad agreed to dismantle Syria’s chemical 
weapons stockpile, there is mounting evidence that his government is flouting international 
law by dropping chlorine bombs on oppositions-held areas. The latest allegations of these 
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attacks came only days after the UN Security Council condemned the use of chemical 
weapons including chlorine in Syria. According to AI and HRW, barrels bombs have been 
used to deliver chlorine gas in and around the town of Sermine, located in the province of 
Idlib, northern Syria. On 16 March 2015 an entire family with their three children no more 
than three years old, were killed in one of the attacks. In total, 100 people were exposed to the 
toxic levels of chlorine during these chemical weapons attacks (AI, 17 March 2015). Medical 
staff told AI that those affected by the attacks showed symptoms characteristic of chemical 
weapons attack, including reddened eyes, shortness of breath, continuous coughing, 
respiratory distress, vomiting, and drooling from the mouth. Philip Luther, Middle East and 
North Africa Programme Director at AI declared: “These horrific attacks (…) are yet more 
evidence that the Syrian government forces are committing war crimes with impunity. The 
situation in Syria must be referred to the International Criminal Court as a matter of urgency” 
(AI, 17 March 2015). The use of chlorine in war is banned under the Geneva protocol of 
1925.  
4.1.5 The conflict in Syria now 
Today, the government of Syria has lost control over a large part of the territory. However, 
despite four years of conflict, the regime of Bashar al-Assad shows only limited signs of 
erosion and still has some support in the population. More significantly, by aligning itself 
with allies such as Iran and Russia, the Syrian regime managed to gather material support 
critical to its survival. The Syrian government thus gained support from the Hezbollah, a Shia 
Islamist militia based in Lebanon, designated as a terrorist organization by most of the 
Western countries and funded primarily by Iran. The Hezbollah and the Iran revolutionary 
guard have played an essential role in the Syrian conflict by providing logistical, military, and 
financial support to the fight against the opposition. On the other side, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar and other Arab states along with the US, UK and France, have supported to some 
degrees the opposition. Overall, because of the involvement of foreign players, the Syrian 
conflict now has features of a proxy war (Masri, 14 March 2015).  
In the armed opposition, groups that are not affiliated to the FSA have emerged with 
the support of external sponsors. These have contributed to the radicalization of the 
opposition by favouring Islamic armed groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra, a group linked to the 
Iraqi wing of al-Qaida (IICISyria, 5 February 2013:8). Another radical jihadist group, the 
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Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) - also known as ISIL but lately renamed as Islamic 
State (IS), has recruited fighters from all over the world and has developed into a well-
organized, dominant armed force. By June 2014, the IS proclaimed the establishment of a 
caliphate and took control of extensive territory in Syria and Iraq by taking advantage of the 
chaos created by the civil war. The rise of IS as major player represent a significant threat to 
further destabilize the region. Attacks against civilians in Iraq and Syria led the US and their 
allies to launch airstrikes against key positions of the IS. As a consequence of the 
radicalization, some of the international and regional backing to the Syrian opposition has 
been markedly cooled down. Foreign supporters of the Syrian opposition are now struggling 
to prevent their support falling in the hands of hard line Islamist rebels instead of the 
moderate groups. The US and the coalition are now arming a 5.000-strong force of 
"moderate" rebels to take the fight against IS in Syria. At the same time, a significant air 
support is provided to Kurdish militia seeking to defend three autonomous enclaves in the 
north of the country (BBC, 12 March 2015). 
4.1.6 The different faces of the Syrian opposition  
The Syrian opposition has struggled to develop from a political movement into an 
administration able to govern the country. Before 2011, political opposition was gathered 
under the Syrian National Council (SNC), a movement that presented itself as the legitimate 
representative for the Syrian people and as an alternative to the Syrian government (SNC, 
2011). The SNC is constituted mainly by Sunni and has been supporting the 2011 uprising 
from its start. In order to prepare a political transition and to prevent a sectarian development 
of the conflict, the international society requested the SNC to make a coalition that is “more 
diverse and inclusive” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015). This led to the 
creation of The National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, also 
known as the Syrian Coalition (SC) in November 2012. Together with the SC, The Supreme 
Joint Military Command of the Syrian Revolution, (SMC), was created to ensure unity of the 
various armed groups (including the FSA) by establishing a formal chain of command at a 
national level. The SMC was purposed as the Defence Ministry of the SC, aiming at 
managing security and stability during the political transition. The international society 
recognized the SC as the sole legitimate political representative of the Syrian people (Sofer 
and Shrafroth, 2013). Even though the SC managed to gather a wider diversity of opposition 
groups, it misses the support of others like the National Coordination Committee for 
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Democratic Change and the radical Islamic groups. Divisions persists inside the SC, about 
possible peace negotiations with the Syrian regime (Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2015).  
4.1.7 International responses to the Syrian crisis 
Even though the events of the Syrian uprising have been early documented, the international 
response to the conflict has been delayed. By the time the first trans-national initiatives took 
place in order to address the conflict and its repercussions, Syrian people were in the midst of 
the repression and the first atrocities were already exposed in international media. Through its 
initiatives, the international society displayed wide divergences of attitude regarding how to 
address the Syrian crisis. Allies of Syria are reluctant to let the crisis result in a regime 
change, whereas several countries consider that the Syrian regime itself is the major obstacle 
to ending the violence. The Security Council, one of the highest authority regarding 
international decisions, has been unable to find a consensus, thus preventing the UN to take 
decisive measures to stop the violence in Syria. Initiatives were also made outside the UN 
system, involving several countries and members of the League of Arab States. So far, most 
of the efforts aiming at solving the Syrian crisis by using legal action, negotiations or 
sanctions have failed. Under in the perspective of RtoP, one can consider that the international 
society actually failed in its duty to protect Syrian civilians from mass atrocities.  
4.1.7.1 UN resolutions 
It is only from October 2011 that the UN Security Council members started to propose 
resolutions condemning the brutal crackdown against protestors and demanding an immediate 
end to all violence. France, Germany, Portugal, UK and Ireland draft the following 
declaration, recognizing the threat to human rights in Syria:  
“(…) strongly condemns the continued grave and systematic human rights violations 
and the use of force against civilians by the Syrian authorities and expresses profound 
regret at the deaths of thousands of people including women and children (…) 
reaffirming the need to resolve the current crisis in Syria peacefully (…) stressing that 
the only solution to the current crisis in Syria is through an inclusive and Syrian-led 
political process” (Security Council, 2011).  
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Three following resolutions were proposed in these terms, and were all vetoed by Russia and 
China. On 22 May 2014, a resolution including a referral of the situation in Syria to ICC was 
co-sponsored by 65 member states and voted in favour by all the Security Council, aside from 
Russia and China (Security Council, 2014).  
However, on 27 September 2013, the Security Council showed some unity when it 
unanimously adopted a legally binding resolution (Resolution 2118) that required Syria to 
give up its chemical weapons. If Syria failed to abide, the Security Council could have taken 
action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which implies economical actions or even 
military action. Even though the Syrian government agreed to abandon its chemical weapons 
to international instances, under supervision by the Organisation for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons (OPCW), it continued to use devastating weapons against civilians. The 
Security Council expressed further concern about such violence, by authorizing resolution 
that:  
“demands that all parties immediately cease all attacks against civilian, as well as the 
indiscriminate employment of weapons in populated areas, including shelling and 
aerial bombardment, such as the use of barrel bombs and methods of warfare” 
(Security Council, 2014).  
According to the Middle East and North Africa deputy director for HRW, Assad’s regime 
wouldn’t stop to use barrel bombs because it doesn’t fear any strong international action 
(HRW, February 2015). Similarly, the Security Council issued resolutions that ordered all 
parties to the conflict to allow humanitarian access, without concrete results. While Syrian 
civilians experience terror daily, the international society represented by the UN remains 
unable to prevent the continuous attacks from the regime.  
On 6 March 2015, based on the latest reports of chlorine gas attacks by the OPCW, 
the Security Council adopted the resolution 2209 condemning the use of chlorine gas, 
recalling that toxic chemicals used as a weapon in Syria would violate both resolution 2118 
and Chemical Weapons Convention, and that measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
will be imposed in the event of future non-compliance (UN Meetings Coverage and Press 
Releases, 2015). Additionally, the resolution "stresses that those individuals responsible for 
any use of chemicals as weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic chemical, must be 
held accountable". The OPCW documented “compelling confirmation” that chlorine was used 
	   35	  
“systematically and repeatedly” as a weapon in villages in northern Syria. The responsible of 
these attacks was not assigned by the OPCW, even though its fact-finding missions possess 
eyewitness accounts of helicopters dropping barrels bombs with toxic chemicals (OPCW, 
2014).   
4.1.7.2 The League Of Arab States 
 In November 2011, the League Of Arab States (the Arab League) called on the Syrian 
government to a peace plan that includes a halt of violence, the release of detainees, the free 
access to media, the visit of an Arab League observer mission and the withdraw of 
government’s forces from the cities. The Syrian government’s initial refusal led to economic 
sanctions and the suspension of Syria’s member ship of the Arab League. This triggered a 
complete turnaround from the Syrian government and the signing of the peace plan on 19 
December 2011 (International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP), 2014).  
The Arab League mission, mandated to observe and report on the crisis, was deployed 
on 24 December 2011 but due to security concerns, it ended already at the end of January 
2012. The UN backed up the Arab League’s initiative, resulting in the creation of an UN-
Arab League joint operation leaded by special envoy Kofi Annan on 23 February 2012 
(IICISyria, 16 August 2012:6). The Security Council authorized the deployment of the UN 
Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) to monitor a six-point peace plan presented by Kofi 
Annan, which included cessation of violence and the commitment to work on a political 
solution to the crisis by all parties of the conflict. The ceasefire came into effect on 12 April 
2012, followed by the deployment of UNSMIS on 21 April 2012. However, the ceasefire only 
lasted for a short period. Violence continued to escalate, the activities of UNSMIS were 
suspended and the mission’s mandate came to an end on 19 August 2012 (IICISyria, 16 
August 2012:7). Kofi Annan left his post by referring to the “clear lack of unity” in the 
Security Council as a major obstacle to find a solution to the crisis, citing “when the Syrian 
people desperately need action, there continues to be finger-pointing and name-calling in the 
Security Council” (BBC, 2 August 2012). Lakhdar Brahimi replaced Kofi Annan, and was 
also unable to negotiate an end to the violence between the Syrian government and the 
opposition. Lakhdar Brahimi declared that the Syrian conflict has reached an “unprecedented 
levels of horror” and that “the country is breaking up before everyone’s eyes” (ALJAZEERA, 
30 January 2013). Brahimi was succeeded by Staffan de Mistura July 2014.  
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4.1.7.3 Other initiatives to solve the Syrian crisis 
Sanctions from the international society; the European Union (EU), the United States, Turkey 
and the Arab League, have been imposed against the Syrian regime. Already in May 2011, the 
EU imposed economic sanctions; including both an arms embargo and targeted sanctions on 
individuals and entities, like assets freeze and visa ban (ICRtoP, 2014). These sanctions have 
been prolonged regularly throughout the conflict. 
 During his period as an UN-Arab League special envoy, Kofi Annan initiated The 
Action Group for Syria, an UN-backed group that gathered in Geneva on 30 June 2012 
finding a political solution to the conflict in Syria. The group consist of representatives from 
the UN and the Arab League, foreign ministers from the five permanent members of the 
Security Council, the foreign ministers of Turkey and Iraq and the high representative of the 
EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The Action Group for Syria agreed on measures 
for a peaceful political transition and demanded all parties of the conflict to fully implement 
the six-point plan of Kofi Annan and to cooperate with UNSMIS. The measures request the 
establishment of a transitional government with full executive powers body, which should 
include both members of the present government and the opposition. The Action Group for 
Syria declared that “the conflict must be resolved through peaceful dialogue and negotiation 
alone” (UN Action Group for Syria Final Communiqué, 30 June 2012). Efforts from the 
international society were made to persuade both sides of the conflict to attend the Geneva II 
peace talks. However, due to Assad’s refusal to share power with the opposition and the 
opposition’s refusal to participate without a guarantee that Assad would step down, the 
measures present in the final communiqué of the Action Group for Syria were never 
implemented.  
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4.2 Gaddafi’s Libya 
 
Figure 3: Political map of Libya 
 
In 1951, Libya became independent from Italy and was declared a constitutional monarchy. 
Oil was discovered in 1959, bringing substantial wealth to one of the poorest nations at that 
time. However, the unfair distribution of wealth generated social discontent, leading to a 
military coup that overthrew the pro-western King Idris al-Senusi in 1969. The coup, known 
as the al-Fateh Revolution, was led by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi (IICILibya, 1 June 
2011:19). 
	   38	  
Like many heads of State in the region, Gaddafi supported pan-Arabism. Furthermore, 
he introduced his own political theory, which he called “The Third Universal Way”. 
Gaddafi’s ideology, outlined in his “Green Book”, pretended to be totally stripped from 
communistic and capitalistic ideas, and based instead on a democratic system that combined 
socialism and Islam. Gaddafi rejected the representation-based system present in most liberal 
democracies, and he introduced elements of direct democracy by implementing peoples 
committees. Libya’s political system became known as “Jamahiriya” meaning the “State of 
the masses”. In reality, Gaddafi had an absolute power as the country’s undisputed leader who 
controlled all major aspects of Libya’s political and economic life. Gaddafi’s family members 
were appointed to key functions with power over the legislature and command positions 
within the military, including the “mukhabarat”, Libya’s national intelligence service. The 
Revolutionary Committees, which were controlled by regime loyalists, were instrumental in 
supporting Gaddafi’s ideology and rule (IICILibya, 1 June 2011:19-20).   
The Jamahiriya system of government consisted in one-man rule using fear, 
intimidation and loyalty-based incentives. During Gaddafi’s four decades grip on power, 
human rights violations were commonplace and the Rule of Law was non-existent. Freedom 
of expression and association were criminalized and subjected to penalties, including death 
and life imprisonment. People opposing and criticising the political system were likely to be 
detained, sometimes incommunicado, and tortured. Civil and political rights, including free 
access to non-state media, were strictly limited and controlled by the regime. Political parties 
and independent non-governmental organisations working on human rights or political 
matters were banned according to the Law. The Libyan law 71, whose purpose was to 
regulate the formation and the activity of associations, states that associations engaged in 
political activity opposed to the principles of the al-Fateh Revolution are illegal and can be 
punished by death. Facing criticism, the Libyan government argued that freedom of 
association and assembly are not required in a political system based on “popular power”. A 
Libyan official declared to HRW: “The right to demonstrate is a right in the traditional sense. 
But that implies there are two sides, the rulers and the ruled. But when we talk about one 
group, there is no need” (HRW, 25 January 2006).   
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4.2.1 The brutal crackdown of the Libyan uprising 
“In 1996, Libyan authorities killed 1,200 prisoners on one day in Abu Salim and they still 
haven't acknowledged doing anything wrong that day (…) Today the Libyan government has 
shown the world that it is still using ruthless brutality against its population” (HRW, 20 
February 2011).  Inspired by the uprising unfolding in neighbour Tunisia and Egypt, Libyans 
planned to demonstrate against the 42-year rule of Gaddafi on 17 February 2011. This date is 
known to the opposition as “the Day of Rage”, to remember the killing of 12 protestors by 
Libyan security forces during a peaceful demonstration in 2006. The Libyan authorities 
anticipated the protest and, in order to prevent mass demonstration, several pro-democracy 
activists were arrested ahead of the 17 February. On 15 February 2011, after the arrest of a 
prominent lawyer (who was representing the relatives of the victims of the 1996 Abu Salim 
prison massacre), protests broke out in Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city. The Police 
injured several demonstrators and killed at least one, sparking mass demonstrations in the 
following days (HRW, 17 February 2011).  
Thousands of people took to the streets in Benghazi, demanding democracy, Rule of 
Law, and the end of Gaddafi’s regime. Gaddafi’s forces responded with brutality to these 
peaceful demonstrations, resulting in dozens of deaths and injuries. The crackdown triggered 
further demonstrations and spread to several other cities, including Misrata, Darnah, Tobruk, 
Zintan and Tripoli (IICILibya, 1 June 2011:23-24). In several places the security forces 
opened fire at the crowds with live ammunition, without warning. Media also reported the use 
of fighter aircrafts to attack the demonstrators. On 20 February, HRW declared that at least 
233 people had been killed over four days (HRW, 20 February 2011). According to an 
estimate given by the ICC, the government forces killed 500-700 civilians in February alone. 
Multiple eyewitnesses confirmed that Gaddafi’s forces fired indiscriminately at peaceful 
demonstrators. Hospital doctors reported deaths and injuries from gunshot wounds in the head 
and the upper body, indicating “shoot to kill” operations. Arbitrarily detention, torture and 
enforced disappearances, many of which remain unaccounted for, were reported in the early 
days of the demonstrations. The IICILibya received numerous reports about injured protestors 
being denied medical treatment or being abducted from the hospitals by the government 
forces (IICILibya, 1 June 2011:35-47).  
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On 22 February, Gaddafi declared on Libyan National Television that Libya “will be 
purged inch by inch, house by house, household by household, alley by alley, and individual 
by individual until I purify this land”, and called the protestors “rats who need to be executed” 
(IICILibya, 1 June 2011: 24).  
4.2.2 The Libyan Opposition 
Following the crackdown, defected soldiers from Gaddafi’s army and civilians came together 
from different cities, took up arms, and formed the “Free Libyan Army”, also known as the 
“National Libyan Army”. The opposition forces established the National Transitional Council 
(NTC), originally known as the Libyan Interim National Council with the aim to provide 
political and military leadership. NTC was formed in Benghazi on 27 February 2011 
(officially declared establish 5 March 2011) and pledged to lead the uprising and oversee the 
transition period to an elected government after the liberation of Libya. The members of the 
council were mostly defectors and returned exiles. Mustafa Abdul Jalil, former Justice 
Minister who resigned because of the mass violence against unarmed protestors, became the 
leader of the NTC (BBC, 25 August 2011).   
4.2.3 Libya’s Civil War 
Clashes with the government forces intensified, and the opposition quickly gained foothold in 
the cities. In Benghazi the opposition forces captured the Airport and the Katiba, a military 
garrison guarded by several Libyan military units. By late February, the opposition was 
controlling Benghazi, Tobruk (in eastern Libya), Misrata and Zuwarah (in the west of Libya) 
(IICILibya, 1 June 2011: 24).   
Gaddafi’s forces conducted a brutal military campaign, in order to regain control of 
lost territory and to neutralize the opposition, and in a declaration that Bellamy and Williams 
describes as direct echoes of the Rwandan genocide, Gaddafi stated that “soldiers have been 
deployed to all regions so that they can purify all decisions from these cockroaches and any 
Libyan who takes arms against Libya will be executed” (Bellamy and Williams 2011:838). 
Residential neighbourhoods in areas held by the opposition were indiscriminately attacked, 
with rockets, mortars and cluster bombs, injuring and killing unarmed habitants. The ground 
forces operated by “shooting anything that moves”, thus killing residents who tried to escape 
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the bombardments. Tens of thousands of civilians fled in fear of reprisals for having 
supported, or for being perceived as having supported, the revolt (AI, 2011:34).  
 
Figure 4: Portraits of disappeared people on display at al-Huwari Hospital, Benghazi. 
4.2.4 International Responses to the Libyan crisis 
The international society, including Human Rights groups and regional organisations like the 
African Union (AU), the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Arab League, 
called for action early on during the Libyan crisis. Different measures were advocated on how 
to respond to the violence carried out by the Libyan authorities against the civilians.	  
4.2.4.1 UN Resolutions  
On 26 February 2011, members of the Security Council adopted unanimously the resolution 
1970. It imposed an arms embargo and targeted sanctions, like travel ban and assets freeze on 
Gaddafi and his family members, including key members of the government. In addition, the 
resolution referred the situation in Libya since 15 February to the Prosecutor of the ICC for 
investigating into reports of crimes against humanity (Security Council, 26 February 2011). 
Furthermore, the Security Council confirmed that “it would keep the actions of the Libyan 
authorities under continuous review and would be prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or 
lift the prescribed measures in light of compliance or no-compliance with the resolution” (UN 
Meeting Coverage and Press Releases, 26 February 2011).   
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As the non-military measures authorized in resolution 1970 failed to end Gaddafi’s 
violence on protestors, the Security Council - acting under Chapter VII - passed a new 
resolution. The resolution 1973 authorized the use of all necessary measures, including the 
imposition of a no-fly zone to prevent further attacks on civilians in Libya, with the exception 
of a foreign occupation. It was adopted with ten votes and five abstentions (Russia, China, 
India, Brazil and Germany), on 17 March 2011. In addition, the resolution enforced the arms 
embargo, strengthened the sanctions and established a panel of experts for further 
recommendation on actions (Security Council, 17 March 2011).   
4.2.4.2 Military intervention in Libya 
On 19 March 2011, a multinational coalition began a military operation in Libya enforcing 
the resolutions mandated by the Security Council. On 31 March 2011, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO) took over the command of the military campaign, named 
Operation Unified Protector. NATO launched 25.944 air sorties in Libya, of which 17.939 
were armed, until the operation officially ended on 31 October 2011 (IICILibya, 8 March 
2012:16). According to both IICILibya and HRW, NATO took important steps to minimise 
civilian casualties by employing the exclusive use of precision-guided munitions and a 
generally cautious approach to targeting. NATO told the IICILibya that it had a standard of 
“zero expectation” of death or injury to civilians, and that no targets were struck if there was 
any reason to believe civilians would be injured or killed by a strike. NATO declared to have 
followed dedicated procedures to reduce destruction and human losses, such as delayed fusing 
of ammunitions to minimize collateral effects, minimum-sized munitions and warnings to the 
population in the form of leaflets and radio broadcasts before airstrikes were carried out 
(IICILibya, 8 March 2012:16).  
Despite these precautions, civilian deaths were reported and significant damage to 
civilian infrastructure occurred in some places. Fred Abrahams, special adviser at HRW 
points out that: “NATO took important steps to minimize civilians casualties during the Libya 
campaign, but information and investigations are needed to explain why 72 civilians died” 
(HRW, 14 May 2012). HRW led an investigation in target sites where civilian deaths 
occurred, amounting to 72 victims, including 20 women and 24 children. The study indicates 
that in seven out of eight bombing sites examined, no military target was present when the 
NATO strikes occurred (HRW, 14 May 2012). IICLibya has investigated 20 NATO airstrikes. 
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They could document a total of 60 civilians killed and 55 injured as the consequence of 5 
strikes (IICILibya, 8 March 2012:16).   
The report of the IICLibya concluded that NATO did not deliberately target civilians 
in Libya. IICLibya also observes that in the few population centres where NATO carried out 
air strikes, extensive precautions were taken to avoid killing civilians. Whereas the HRW 
investigation questions “what exactly NATO forces were striking” in the target sites devoid of 
military objectives, the IICILibya found that information lacked to determine whether these 
strikes were based on incorrect or out-dated intelligence and whether “they were consistent 
with NATO’s objective to take all necessary precautions to avoid civilian casualties entirely” 
(IICILibya, 8 March 2012:17). In such instances, the ICIIL recommended further 
investigations in order to provide accountability and compensation.  
4.2.4.3 AU’s peace initiative 
The no-fly zone was welcomed by the Arab League and the OIC. Indeed, the Arab League 
had called on the Security Council on the 12th of March, to impose a no-fly zone due to the 
Libyan authorities use of military aircraft, mortars and heavy weaponry against civilians. 
However, the Arab League rejected foreign intervention and “indicated that failure to take 
appropriate action now to end the crisis would lead to such intervention in internal Libyan 
affairs” (Security Council Report, 2011). On the other hand, consistently addressing a 
peaceful solution to the crisis the AU rejected any external military intervention and most of 
its members did not support the no-fly zone. 
Trying to find a political solution to the Libyan crisis, the AU issued a “Roadmap for 
peace”, which called for an immediate ceasefire, the deployment of monitoring mechanism 
and “the implementation, in a peaceful and democratic manner, of political reforms that meet 
the aspirations of the Libyan people” (AU Press Release, 2011). While Gaddafi accepted the 
proposals, there was no trust among the opposition that he would adhere to a ceasefire or hand 
over to an interim government. The leadership of NTC rejected the plan and announced, “the 
demand of our people from day one was that Gaddafi must step down” (Aljazeera, 12 April 
2011). Moreover, the NTC said that the roadmap was out of date, since it did not take into 
account human rights violations already perpetrated by Gaddafi’s forces.    
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4.2.4.4 Other initiatives  
The EU and individual states, like the US, Canada, and Switzerland reacted early to the crisis 
by imposing economical sanctions (like assets freeze) against Libya, and also targeted Libya’s 
sovereign wealth fund, which is the 13th largest in the world. Arms embargo and travel ban on 
Gaddafi and key members of his family were also imposed (BBC, 11 March 2011). On 29 
March 2011, leaders from more than 35 governments and NGOs met in London to discuss the 
deteriorating situation in Libya. They agreed to establish the Libya Contact Group to lead 
international effort to map out Libya’s future, “to provide a leadership and overall political 
direction” in close coordination with the UN, AU, Arab League, the OIC and the EU 
(France24, 29 March 2011). By mid July 2011, the international contact group on Libya, 
recognized the NTC as the sole legitimate representative of the Libyan people by announcing 
that “the participants agreed to deal with the National Transitional Council (NTC) as the 
legitimate governing authority in Libya” (Reuters Africa, 15 July 2011). AU was one of the 
last regional organisations to recognize the NTC as Libya’s legitimate governing body 
(ICRtoP, 2015).  
4.2.5 Libya after the death of Gaddafi  
“Declaration of Liberation. Raise your head high, you are a free Libyan,” (BBC NEWS, 23 
October 2011 - Abdul Hafez Ghoga, NTC Vice Chairman).  On 20 October 2011, Gaddafi 
was captured and killed outside Sirte by the Misrata thuwar (revolutionaries) (IICILibya, 8 
March 2012:8). The NTC declared national liberation three days later and asked the 
celebrating Libyans for forgiveness, tolerance and reconciliation (BBC NEWS, 23 October 
2011). Despite these calls to national unity, Libya quickly collapsed into chaos as a myriad of 
armed groups began competing for political power and economic resources. Armed violence 
continued with tribal clashes and fighting between militias, deteriorating the security situation 
and developing a state of lawlessness. Even though the democratic transition was initiated 
early, the NTC and successively elected government failed to establish control over this 
growing numbers of militias (ICRtoP, 2015).  
The new political situation has increasingly polarised the tensions between eastern and 
western Libya, and clashes rage between armed groups fighting for the rival factions that are 
laying claim to governance and legitimacy. Major warring factions are a coalition of Islamist 
forces and militia groups from Misrata united under the name Libyan Dawn, and a coalition 
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consisting of eastern tribes, federalists and other military units, named Operation Dignity. 
Foreign influence plays a significant role in deepening the political divisions, as Egypt and 
the United Arab Emirates provide support to Operation Dignity whereas Qatar, Turkey, and 
Sudan are backing the Libyan Dawn (Wehrey Frederic, 2014). The turmoil is such that 
Islamist militants, including fighters who proclaim loyalty to either al-Qaeda or the IS, have 
established bases, attacked oil fields and entered central regions. 
UN has been trying to pursue peace talk between the political rivals. On 27 March 
2015, the UN envoy said that the latest peace talks between the two opposing governments 
has reached a consensus on a range of issues, including on the need for a unity government 
and security arrangements, strongly believing that there now are a political solution the crisis 
(UN News Centre, 27 March 2015).  
4.3 Comparative analysis of the Libyan and Syrian crisis 
In this chapter, I am going to fit the empirical data under the criteria established by the ICISS. 
By interpreting each crisis under the criteria just cause, right authority, right intention, last 
resort, proportional means, reasonable prospects. I will be able to determine if the specific 
situations presented validity for the ICISS to motivate a military intervention for humanitarian 
purpose. 
4.3.1 Just cause 
The ICISS considers a military intervention for humanitarian purposes justified if large-scale 
loss of life is either an actual or a threatened occurrence. During the consultations of the 
ICISS there was a display of unanimity that mass violence, either shocking the conscience of 
humanity or presenting a clear danger to the international security, is a clear element to 
motivate military intervention for the protection of human beings. Both Libyan and Syrian 
conflicts presented situations of mass violence and for the later, the amplitude of the crisis 
leads to grave regional consequences.  
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Addressing the crisis in Syria is just and necessary 
The largest humanitarian crisis of today is unfolding in Syria. The humankind has been 
shocked by the brutality the Syrian people have been subjected to. The Syrian conflict has 
been marked by war crimes, crimes against humanity, widespread human rights abuses and 
shocking indifferences for the lives of civilians, particularly by the Syrian regime. The 
conflict and its humanitarian consequences clearly pose a threat to peace and security in 
neighbouring countries, to the broader region and to the world. As the Syrian conflict is 
entering its fifth year, the Syrian people continue to bear the brunt of this crisis.  
More than 220.000 Syrians have lost their lives (more than half of them are civilians) 
since the beginning of the conflict and more than one million are injured and in desperate 
need for medical treatment. According to Violation Documentation Centre in Syria (VDC), an 
independent NGO monitoring and documenting human rights violations, 14.018 of the killed 
civilians are children and nearly 9.000 of them are women (VDC, 2015). The UN estimates 
that 12.2 million people remain in dire need for humanitarian assistance and protection inside 
Syria, nearly half being children. The violence created 7.6 million of internal displaced 
people, and many of them have been forced to flee their homes more than once (UNOCHA, 
2015). On 7 May 2015, UNHCR registered 3.977.211 Syrian refugees outside Syria, mostly 
present in neighbouring countries. Countries which have experienced recent unrest, like 
Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon, have welcomed 2.2 million refugees. Turkey has registered 
1.7 million of Syrians refugees within its borders (UNHCR, 2015). Generally, the rest of the 
international society has largely stood on the side lines for providing humanitarian assistance 
to the Syrian refugees. Western industrialised countries have promised to provide relief and 
support to the countries hosting Syrian refugees, but delivered little in reality. 
The unbalanced effort to provide assistance to the Syrian refugees has created a huge 
strain on the economical and social infrastructure in the countries neighbours of Syria. In 
response to the growing number of refugees, Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey have imposed 
severe restrictions on entry at the Syrian border, leaving hundreds of thousands trapped inside 
Syria and facing abuses by the IS, government forces and others. Closed borders have forced 
refugees to take dangerous routes and being exposed to human rights abuses. While numerous 
countries in the Gulf, Europe and North America are deploying military efforts to counter the 
IS, these countries have let down the populations that are fleeing the atrocities committed by 
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the group (AI, 2014:7). Taken together, violation of human rights, attacks on civilians and 
humanitarian consequences constitutes elements sufficient to provide a just cause for military 
intervention in the case of Syria. 
Demonstration of state terrorism urged the protection of civilians during the Libyan crisis 
In Libya, the international society displayed a clear unity for taking action and preventing 
mass atrocities. Prior to NATO’s intervention, the killing of peaceful protestors showed that 
Gaddafi’s regime would not hesitate to commit atrocities towards its own people in order to 
repress dissent. The Libyan government deliberately cut off phone lines and Internet during 
the early days of the uprising, which made difficult to document the exact number of victims. 
However, there is compelling evidence showing that government forces used excessive force 
against the protestors during the peaceful demonstrations, killing and injuring dozens of 
civilians. Protestors have been attacked with warfare equipment such as machineguns, 
snipers, military planes, tanks and helicopters. 
Shortly after the beginning of the uprising Navi Pillay, former UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, and other UN authorities condemned the violations in 
Libya by saying they may amount to crimes against humanity. When addressing the opening 
of a UNHRC session on 25 February 2011, Pillay urged action to end the violence in Libya 
and to hold the perpetrators of atrocities accountable: “in brazen and continuing breach of 
international law, the crackdown in Libya of peaceful demonstrations is escalating alarmingly 
with reported mass killings, arbitrary arrests, detention and torture of protestors” (UN News 
Centre, 25 February 2011). Pillay supported her allegations with reports of thousands being 
killed or injured over the first weeks of the uprising. Despite Gaddafi’s effort to conceal the 
reality of the crackdown, the rest of the world saw that Libya’s government quickly 
responded to the opposition by using the most brutal methods. Such response constituted a 
deliberate intention of Gaddafi’s regime, which if left unhindered, could have resulted in 
large-scale atrocities. The threat to the Libyan population in general, as demonstrated by the 
non-discriminatory nature of the repression, provided a just cause for military intervention.  
4.3.2 Right authority 
The role of the UN Security Council in giving legitimacy to a military intervention has been 
emphasized by the ICISS. Even though the ICISS expressed doubts about the ability of the 
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Security Council to produce decisive actions, it has been the major organ of consultation used 
during the Libyan and Syrian crises. During the period we study, no other institution could 
have substituted to the Security Council for reaching a global agreement on a topic as 
sensitive as military intervention. In this context, the UN Security Council can be viewed as 
the only institution that could have provided the right authority for permitting military 
intervention both in Libya and Syria.  
It is only in the case of Libya that the UN Security Council voted a resolution 
authorizing all necessary measures to protect the Libyan civilians. It resulted in establishing a 
no-fly zone and tightening the already existing sanctions on the Gaddafi regime and its 
supporters. In the case of Syria, despite the extraordinary brutality of the conflict, the Security 
Council did not allowed similar measures to be imposed. Every resolution with the purpose to 
hold the Syrian government accountable for mass atrocities has been vetoed by Russia or 
China, using the argument that such resolutions are paving the way for a foreign military 
intervention. When Russia and China vetoed a fourth resolution, which would have referred 
the situation in Syria to the ICC for investigation, Samantha Power, UN ambassador uttered: 
“The Syrian people will not see justice today. They will see crime, but not punishment. The 
vetoes today have prevented the victims of atrocities from testifying at The Hague” (The 
Guardian, 22 May 2014). Her allegations were supported by photographic evidence produced 
by a defector of the governmental forces, documenting the killing of 11.000 detainees in 
Syrian prisons. Some member states thus made clear appeals to the UN Security Council to 
work as one and to take proximate steps to end atrocities in Syria.  
The resolution 2118 imposed Chapter VII measures in the event of non-compliance of 
Syria to the destruction of its chemical stockpile. In spite of this, repeated chemical attacks 
using chlorine were documented later, recently forcing the Security Council to acknowledge 
in the resolution 2209 that the previous resolution has been violated. The paralysis of the 
Security Council during the Syrian crisis is clearly illustrated by the exchanges that followed 
the adoption of the resolution 2209. Report from the OPCW concluded that chlorine gas was 
released in barrel bombs dropped from helicopters. Based on the fact that the Syrian army 
possesses helicopters and not the opposition, the US, Britain and France accused the Syrian 
regime of using chlorine gas against civilians. On the opposite, Russia maintains that it does 
not constitute an evidence for the responsibility of the Syrian government and insists that 
OPCW is only mandated to assess the situation, and not to assign blame for the attacks (UN 
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Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 2015). Therefore, divergences on the interpretation of 
facts and the lack of formal way to attribute the responsibility of the attacks prevented the 
UN’s most powerful body to take measures that could stop further attacks. Without any 
possibility to attribute such blame, the use of sanctions under Chapter VII, which may include 
coercive action, cannot be decided within the Security Council.  
A fundamental condition of military intervention for humanitarian purpose, which is 
the approval by a right authority, is different in the Libyan and Syrian cases. Within the most 
similar system, this difference therefore represents the decisive factor for determining the 
final outcome, whether or not a military intervention is taking place. 
4.3.3 Right intention 
Within the concept of RtoP, the only relevant objective for a military intervention consists in 
the protection of human beings. The right intention is arguably the most sensitive criterion to 
defend in international discussions. For a military intervention to be considered as carrying 
the right intention, a minimal degree of trust has to exist between the different parties which 
constitute either the right authority endorsing the intervention, or the body in charge of the 
military intervention. Ideally, perfect trust would require that none of the parties pronouncing 
in favour of the intervention would gain benefit from its consequences. The complexity of the 
relationships between states makes this idea impossible to reach in reality. Therefore, the 
right intention must consist in the adequate formulation of the purpose of the military 
intervention and of its limits. Regarding both Libya and Syria, parties have denounced the 
“masked intentions” of those who are in favour of military intervention. 
The controversial contribution of NATO to Gaddafi’s fall 
When facing protest against its 40 years of ruthless rule, Gaddafi refused to resign and 
instead, declared he would “purify Libya from all those who opposed his rule”. With such 
declarations, Gaddafi made clear he had no intention to quit under pressure from the streets, 
as fellow leaders Mubarak and Ben Ali did in neighbouring Egypt and Tunisia. However, by 
25 February 2011, most of eastern part of Libya had fallen to the opposition, driving Gaddafi 
to regain control by force. In the towns recaptured by Gaddafi’s troops, amounts of evidence 
documented human right violations and war crimes such as indiscriminate executions and 
attacks, arbitrary arrests and detention, disappearances and ill-treatment of prisoners. 
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The military operation mandated by the Security Council prevented a potential 
recapture of the opposition-held Benghazi and has thus been considered as a pivotal event, 
which permitted the rebels’ victory over the forces loyal to Gaddafi. Initially, the resolution 
1973 adopted by the Security Council responded to actual atrocities and was purposed to 
prevent further human right violations. The mandate given by the Security Council therefore 
appeared as a humanitarian move, authorizing “all necessary measures” to protect civilians 
under threat. These measures included the enforcement of a no-fly zone, which is seemingly 
adapted to counter Gaddafi’s use of air weapons against populations.  
The fact that NATO’s military operation contributed to the fall of Gaddafi’s regime 
has been heavily criticized. Vladimir Putin, then Prime Minister of Russia, declared that the 
main intention of NATO’s military intervention was to trigger a regime change, and that the 
fall of Gaddafi violated the Security Council mandate. His argumentation questioned the 
validity of resolution 1973, stating that permitting interference in the internal affairs of other 
states was bearing resemblance with “a medieval summons to a crusade” (Kaczmarski, 2011). 
Despite reluctance from its Prime Minister, the President Dimitrij Medvedev rallied to the 
perceived need to protect the Libyan population, and Russia showed its trust by not opposing 
the resolution 1973. Russia’s approval may have been critically influenced by the position of 
the Arab League, who requested a no fly zone over Libya, and by the positive relationships 
with France at this period (Kaczmarski, 2011). 
  During the military intervention, the leaders of three NATO States (Barack Obama, 
David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy) declared that military action would continue until 
Gaddafi is overthrown. The main reason being that Gaddafi’s actions towards its own people 
discredit him as a State leader: “it is unthinkable that someone who has tried to massacre his 
own people can play a part in the future government” (Cameron, Obama and Sarkozy 2011). 
In addition, the security of the Libyan people cannot be guaranteed if Gaddafi is left in place, 
because Libya risks becoming “not only a pariah state, but a failed state too” (Obama, 
Cameron, Sarkozy 2011). As previously mentioned, a regime change is not considered by the 
ICISS as a legitimate objective of a military intervention for human protecting purposes. 
However, if the authorities of a country are not willing to halt the atrocities against their own 
people it may be essential to discharge the mandate of the Security Council for the purpose of 
protecting civilians. For NATO, the possibility of a regime change was thus considered 
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essential as part of a general attempt towards a long-term protection of civilians and the 
achievement of lasting peace in Libya.  
 According to Bellamy, the adoption of the resolution 1973 by the Security Council is an 
historical event by being the first authorization of use of military force for human protection 
purposes without the host state’s consent. Bellamy considers that the principle of RtoP played 
an important role in shaping the world’s response to the atrocities in Libya, and that the 
resolution 1973 actually reflects a change in the Security Council’s attitude toward the use of 
force for human protecting purposes. With previous displays of its readiness to take "timely 
and decisive action" to prevent or halt mass atrocities, in Resolutions 1674 (2006) and 1894 
(2009), the Security Council had then set a precedent that it will not be inhibited as a matter 
of principle from authorizing enforcement for protection purposes (Bellamy, 2011). 
Solving the Syrian crisis: when right intention meets defiance 
In contrast to the decisive and unified action during the Libyan crisis, the Security Council’s 
actions toward Syria have been pervaded with frictions and hesitation. First on 4 October 
2011, after months of diplomatic efforts to impose sanctions on the Syrian regime, the 
European members presented a draft resolution to the Security Council. The message of the 
draft had been somehow moderated, as a much tougher text had been written in the beginning, 
which included an arms embargo. The text was watered down to meet the concerns of other 
Council members, but it still expressed deep concern over the violence in Syria by “strongly 
condemning the continued grave and systematic human rights violations and the use of force 
against civilians by the Syrian authorities” (Security Council, 2011). Furthermore, the draft 
resolution accused the regime of carrying out arbitrary executions, torture and disappearances 
and demanded that Syria cease the use of force against civilians, release political prisoners 
and grant other fundamental freedoms. The draft resolution proposed that if Syria would fail 
to comply, the council would have to consider “other options” - a veiled reference to 
sanctions. While nine out of 15 members voted in favour of the draft (the minimum needed 
for adoption), Russia and China casted their vetoes. Four countries abstained (Brazil, India, 
Lebanon and South Africa). The UN ambassador from Russia and China expressed their 
concern that such resolution would have worsen the tensions in Syria and could have served 
as a pretext for a possible regime change in the country (UN News, 4 October 2011).   
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 The draft resolution presented on the 4 October 2011 did not make any mention, even 
implicit, of a regime change in Syria and put the emphasis on stopping the actual and future 
human right violations. We can therefore affirm that the authors of had expressed a right 
intention to stop the crisis in Syria. Arguably, the European members of the Council could 
have had in mind that the Syrian regime would not easily comply, and they possibly 
considered that more severe actions would inevitably take place after the adoption of the draft 
resolution. If those coercive actions included military intervention, their main purpose would 
still have been the protection of human beings, no matter Bashar al-Assad leaves the power or 
not. Importantly, and this point will be also discussed in the next chapter, the draft resolution 
did not evoke military intervention. Instead, it was essentially an expression of concern, 
whose objective was to put the Syrian crisis on the working agenda of the Council. In such 
context, one can solely interpret the suspicion of Russia and China toward the draft resolution 
as a mark of mistrust about the right intention of the European members.  
Later during the Syrian crisis, after Bashar al-Assad openly threatened to use chemical 
weapons, the US President Barack Obama warned that doing so would be like “crossing a red 
line” that could trigger an American intervention. These declarations did not prevent chemical 
attacks in the Ghouta area of Damascus on 21 August 2013. As a response to these attacks, 
the resolution 2118 demanded the Syrian regime to get rid of its chemical weapons stockpiles. 
The resolution 2118 warns that non-compliance can lead to the use of force against the Syrian 
regime (which did not occurred despite repeated attacks with chlorine gas). If a military 
intervention were to sanction the non-compliance, we can affirm that it carries the Right 
intention; since the primary goal of resolution 2118 was to cease the use of chemical 
weapons, which is a grave violation of international law (Geneva convention). 
4.3.4 Last resort 
The use of force must always come as the ultimate option, even when the matter is to save 
human lives. As military action involves the use of deadly force, an operation for 
humanitarian purpose must find the most adequate means to protect populations, and at the 
same time must cause the least destruction (this topic will be discussed further in the next 
chapter). Such task is difficult and will always, even in the best hands, result in casualties and 
destruction of civilian infrastructure. For this reason, peaceful alternative and political 
solutions to a humanitarian crisis must always be considered first. Jimmy Carter said about 
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the invasion of Iraq: “for a war to be just, it must meet several clearly defined criteria. The 
war can be waged only as a last resort, with all nonviolent options exhausted” (Carter, 9 
March 2003). In this sense, the criteria last resort serves as a guiding principle to prevent 
hastened decisions leading to war, and to explore every non-military solution to halt crisis. At 
the same time, handling humanitarian crisis can demand decisive action within a timely 
period. To postpone a response can sometimes have fatal consequences and we can risk being 
bystanders to mass murder if the reactions are delayed. Therefore, the principle of last resort 
has to be put in balance with the moral obligation, and often the emergency, to try to put an 
end to atrocities.  
The Libyan military intervention: a decisive and timely response to mass atrocities 
The international society responded to Gaddafi’s brutal crackdown on civilians nearly two 
weeks after the Libyan uprising by imposing sanctions. These non-military measures were 
chosen for their potential effect on the Gaddafi’s regime, with the hope that their pressure 
would lead the Libyan State to halt the violence. This first step to solve the crisis was 
positively welcomed, as shown by its unanimous adoption by the Security Council. However, 
Gaddafi didn’t show any intention to halt the violence and continued to threaten opponents 
with widespread massacres. Confronted to the reluctance of Gaddafi and the urgent need to 
protect civilians, the Council authorized the use of force as a second step. The last resort 
criterion seems to be satisfied in the case of NATO’s military intervention in Libya. Critics of 
the intervention could have questioned the insufficient time left to negotiate the cessation of 
violence with Gaddafi. It is in fact possible that the last decision of the Security Council was 
motivated by the absence of serious alternative to prevent an immediate bloodbath. The verbal 
violence promised by Gaddafi to its opponents, broadly displayed on Libyan media, may have 
echoed the call to murders heard on the infamous “Radio mille collines” before the genocide 
in Rwanda. 
The Syrian crisis: several pleads for action 
In Syria, a myriad of attempts were made, involving the UN and other international bodies, to 
put pressure on the Syrian regime and force it to stop the violence. They did not get their 
expected result and instead, the world witnessed an increase of destruction and atrocities in 
Syria. This situation offers the most striking contrast with the decisive intervention in Libya 
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and some of its main causes have been exposed previously: mistrust and lack of consensus 
among the members of the Security Council. The sanctions imposed by the international 
society may have somehow slow down the eagerness of the Syrian regime to commit crimes, 
but they were not efficient enough to force it to a halt. Equally to Gaddafi, the Syrian regime 
displayed complete indifference toward the concerns of the international society and the 
suffering of its people, even though it may have benefited from a more sophisticated 
communicator in the person of Bashar al-Assad. Political peace talks between the regime and 
the opposition have not come to any significant result and so far, may only bring hope of 
temporary ceasefire in some towns (BBC NEWS, 5 May 2015). In spite of no indication that 
the conflict would end in a near future, no military option has been undertaken or even been 
considered so far. Considering all the non-military measures which have been tried out during 
four years and with the perspective that more human suffering is still to come, the last resort 
would surely justify a military intervention in the case of Syria.  
4.3.5 Proportional means 
The objectives of a military intervention for human protecting purpose differ from those 
usually pursued in armed conflicts or traditional peacekeeping operations. When intervening 
for saving lives, the priority objective is to protect civilians from immediate threats. To reach 
this objective may require military equipment, which causes destruction and loss of life, and 
the use of military strategy, which dictates the most efficient approach to be used. However, 
the use of military force for human protecting purpose is not intended for long-term 
occupation and is not diverted by other targets than those who pose immediate threats to the 
populations at risk. These points make fundamental differences from the general perception of 
armed conflicts, where opponents are seeking control of territories or strategic targets, which 
can provide them better resources for ultimately defeating the enemy. A military operation for 
human protecting purpose also differs from traditional peacekeeping operations because it is 
intended at neutralizing targets rather than defensive position. However, depending on the 
amplitude of the menaces toward populations, a military operation for human protecting 
purpose can evolve into a peacekeeping operation, whose role would be to decrease tensions 
and safeguard peace process (ICISS, 2001:57-58). 
A military intervention for human protecting purpose can face a large variety of the 
threats to civilian populations, ranging from small violent groups to state security forces. The 
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methods used to neutralize these threats efficiently and occasion the least damage are 
conceptualized under proportional means. In the spirit of RtoP, a military intervention is a 
just one if it comes after preventive efforts have failed to solve a humanitarian crisis and end 
with the responsibility to rebuild “so that respect for human life and the rule of law will be 
restored” (ICISS, 2001:67). In addition, a military intervention for human protecting purpose 
can be considered as entirely successful if it not only managed to protect populations at risk, 
but also by “inflicting as little damage as possible so as to enhance recovery prospects in the 
post-conflict phase” (ICISS, 2001:57).  
A proportionate military intervention in Libya?   
During its operation in Libya, NATO presented its strategy as solely focused on neutralizing 
Gaddafi’s forces. NATO’s operations consisted only in precision air strikes. It is possibly the 
best approach to target military objectives which cannot be easily concealed and which are 
clearly distinct from civilian elements (such as armoured vehicles, aircrafts, artillery). 
Airstrikes were therefore a proportionate mean to neutralize the heavy military equipment 
used by Gaddafi’s forces to terrorize civilians. However, and perhaps because of the lack of 
capacity on the ground which could have provided a better pointing at military targets, 
NATO’s airstrikes also caused civilian casualties. The close monitoring of NATO’s 
operations by independent organizations indicated that these casualties could have been 
avoided, as some apparently occurred in non-military target sites. Even though some argue 
that NATO’s airstrikes caused a relatively small number of civilian victims, it is finally still 
hundred more than the zero casualties confidently promised by NATO strategists. It may be 
not surprising that the use of bombs inevitably kills people, but a significant worry in the case 
of Libya is that so far, NATO did not showed signs that it would carry investigation and 
acknowledge the reason why civilian sites were attacked. Lack of transparency and 
accountability may have negatively impacted the perception of NATO in post-Gaddafi’s 
Libya (HRW, 14 May 2012).   
A no-fly zone in Syria can prevent attacks on civilians  
Since mid- October 2014 until mid- March 2015, the human rights organization SOHR has 
documented 10.263 aerial attacks carried out by the Syrian regime, including 5.335 explosive 
barrel bombs dropped by helicopters. These attacks have resulted in 2.172 losses of civilian 
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lives, including women and children. More than 10.000 other civilians were wounded and lots 
of people have been forced to flee their homes. The material damages are enormous, leaving 
people homeless and without medical infrastructure where the wounded can be treated 
(SOHR, 20 March 2015). 
According to a recent report published by AI on 5 May 2015, many citizens of Aleppo 
but also basic infrastructures such as hospitals and schools are forced to move underground to 
escape relentless aerial bombardment by government forces. A resident described the 
aftermath of an attack on al-Fardous neighbourhood in 2014 to AI: “After the bombing, I saw 
children without heads, body parts everywhere. It was how I imagine hell to be” (AI, 5 May 
2015). Philip Luther, AI’s director of the Middle East and North Africa Program considers 
bombings by the Syrian Army as crimes against humanity:  
“Many (Syrians) feel abandoned and have lost all hope for the future. More than a 
year ago the UN passed a resolution calling for an end to human rights abuses, and 
specifically barrel bombs attacks, promising there would be consequences if the 
government failed to comply. Today, the international community has turned its back 
on Aleppo’s civilians in a cold-hearted display of indifference to an escalating human 
tragedy” (AI, 5 May 2015).  
The Syrian crisis has features of unconventional conflicts, notably with the implication of 
police forces, political opposition, and civilians. As the crisis worsened, urban warfare (where 
fighters are using buildings and ruins to operate concealed) has been increasingly deployed 
together with heavy military equipment. The latter is being used mostly by the Syrian Army, 
whose Air force is put at use to deliver non-conventional weapons in an indiscriminate 
fashion over densely populated areas. Such weapons have been the major cause of non-armed 
civilian death during the Syrian conflict, and one of the best ways to prevent this loss of life 
would have been to stop military helicopters and planes to fly over the towns controlled by 
the opposition.  
The enforcement of such no-fly zone may have required costly military effort by 
countries willing to participate, given the strong operative capacity of the Syrian Army. A no-
fly zone in Syria may have met serious challenges. However, a coalition of States succeeded 
to impose a no-fly zone in Northern Iraq in 1991 in order to create “safe havens” for Kurdish 
people who fled repression and threats of mass murder from Saddam Hussein’s regime. The 
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so-called operation “Provide Comfort” provided humanitarian aid and at the same time 
effectively prevented Iraqi Air force to participate in the retribution against Kurds. Despite the 
apparent success, critics questioned the legitimacy of this operation, which was not endorsed 
by the Security Council. There as well, divergences opposed members favourable to the 
military intervention (including those who actually participated to it) and those defending 
non-interference in internal affairs (Russia and China) (Bellamy and Wheeler, 2008).   
If the Security Council today managed to authorize a no-fly zone over Syria, with a 
strictly defined mandate such as the one decided for Libya, it would create an immediate 
relief for the Syrian populations living under the bombs. It is possible that intervention of 
ground troops could have been further required to completely stop the violence against 
civilians. However, one can also consider that just a significant decision from the Security 
Council such as the no-fly zone could give sign to the Syrian regime that it cannot benefit 




Figure 5: Group picture posted on the Internet by residents of Kafranbel in the Idlib 
governorate. Activism through Internet and the social media is widely used by different 
parties of the Syrian conflicts. 
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4.3.6 Reasonable prospects 
The reasonable prospects include diverse considerations, which relate to the situation of the 
country after a military intervention for humanitarian purpose is decided. One of the most 
obvious considerations is whether or not the military intervention will actually manage to 
protect the populations under threat. Ideally, the military intervention for humanitarian 
purpose should have the capacity to quickly neutralize the threats to civilians and yield 
immediately to rebuilding and peacekeeping efforts. Therefore, the decision to intervene can 
be strongly dependent on the capacity to reach and assist the population under threat, and on 
the resources which can be mobilized for the intervention.  
Other considerations are rather related to what is happening after the military 
operations have ended. To prevent further conflicts, rebuilding efforts should be engaged 
rapidly with substantial international support. The deployment of the military intervention 
should be carefully planned in order to optimize the situation post-conflict. I previously 
mentioned the use of proportional means to minimize material losses, but the military 
intervention must also be backed by series of plans to assist the country politically and 
economically. These long-term perspectives can prove very difficult to apprehend. It is 
especially relevant for complex countries such as Syria and Libya, which have a high degree 
of cultural and social stratification, and countries tightly connected to their neighbours. 
According to Seybolt the criterion of reasonable prospect is as critical to legitimate military 
intervention for humanitarian reasons as the just cause criteria (Seybolt, 2007). Even though 
the post-intervention situation can appear uncertain and even risky, it provides an opportunity 
to engage the host country into a brighter development.  
Libya descending into chaos shortly after NATO’s intervention 
In nowadays Libya, four years after NATO’s intervention, the human rights situation has 
deteriorated and the country is facing deep problems of security. Different militias are 
roaming out of control, attacking civilians and civilian properties sometimes with violations 
that amount to war crimes. HRW, who documented violations of international law in Libya 
since 2011, claimed that the violations are so organized and widespread that they amount to 
crimes against humanity. The post-Gaddafi conflict has killed hundreds of people and 
hundred of thousands are internally displaced, contributing to a rise in migrant boats 
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departing Libya for Europe and spilling over to neighbouring countries. Libya today may 
represent a safe haven for terrorist organizations. 
 One can wonder if such situation could have been foreseen when the decision for 
NATO’s military operation was made. The collapse of the central government is one of the 
reasons for the present chaos in Libya. Some may argue that the repressive regime of Gaddafi, 
despite its brutality and illegitimacy, was a key element to keep stability in Libya. However, 
if NATO’s intervention did not happen, there was a risk that Gaddafi’s brutal answer to the 
uprising triggered further radicalisation in the opposition, possibly a terrorist one. This would 
have also led to increased violence in Libya, perhaps different to the present one, or perhaps 
similar to the situation that developed in Syria. Reasonable prospects were certainly present 
in Libya at the time immediately following NATO’s military intervention. Libya’s civic 
institutions were not in such a bad situation, as a transition government was made to function 
quickly and war criminals were supposed to be tried in national courts. Even though the 2011 
conflict had caused damages, the economy of Libya could be rapidly restarted and the 
infrastructures rebuilt. The deterioration of the situation is mainly imputable to political 
rivalries in a context were armed militias were more or less in charge of the national security. 
Soon, stockpiles of weapons from the fallen regime reached criminal groups faster than the 
implementation of efficient security forces. The international society may have 
underestimated the efforts necessary to disarm the groups, to transition to a democratic 
system and to rebuild a strong security apparatus. Countries neighbours of Libya could have 
provided active support to the democratic transition and could have decreased the defiance 
towards foreign assistance by showing signs that the new Libya is welcomed and respected as 
a regional entity. The US President Barack Obama expressed regrets that the coalition 
underestimated the need to follow up:  
“If you want to do this, then it is the day after Gaddafi is gone (…) at that moment, 
there has to be a much more aggressive effort to rebuild societies that didn’t had any 
civic traditions (…) That’s a lesson that I now imply every time I ask the question 
should we intervene militarily, do we have an answer the day after? ” (Obama, 8 
August 2014). 
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Syria: is it too late to intervene? 
In order to answer the question “would a military intervention in Syria have reasonable 
prospects?” one has to remind that the Syrian conflict is now in its fourth year, that it 
escalated from a popular protest to a civil war, and that multiple occasions were offered for 
the UN to decide a military intervention. 
 A military intervention would have been legitimate when first reports of crimes 
against humanity perpetrated by the Syrian regime were made available. At the end of 2011, 
the attacks against civilians were part of a large-scale campaign of terror from the Syrian 
regime to silence the protests. The Security Council could have mandated an extensive 
monitoring operation in the places of uprising, and it could have requested immediate 
cessation of violence with the threat to intervene militarily. If such plan had been assorted 
with sanctions directed against the regime, Bashar al-Assad would have had a clear sign that 
he could not continue the repression without facing consequences. If he chose to ignore them, 
a military intervention would have met all the criteria for granting its legitimacy. Given that 
the opposition was essentially unarmed at this moment, the intervention would have consisted 
in preventing the security forces to reach the main places where protests occurred. However, 
to be effective such operation would have required troops on the grounds. In order to prevent 
a risk of being perceived as an invasion of a Muslim country by Western powers, the 
participation of neighbours such as Turkey could have been instrumental. 
 In the context of a civil war, a military intervention for protecting human beings can 
be perceived more just, but can paradoxically have consequences harder to foresee. 
Preventing police forces to occupy a city can be regarded as a disrespectful act of 
interference, whereas preventing planes to drop toxic gases on cities is generally viewed as a 
brave act of humanity. As argued previously, a military intervention that implements a no-fly 
zone is the best way to prevent further attacks which are now killing most of the people in 
Syria. However, the Syrian opposition is now armed, controlling a significant part of the 
country and unwilling to negotiate with an opponent they view as the illegitimate leader of the 
country. Therefore, there are risks that a military intervention in Syria now leads to radical 
changes. These risks could include a complete military victory of the opposition and the 
collapse of the regime. As the opposition is divided, this first eventuality would likely result 
in a complete chaos similar or worse to the present Libya. Another risk would be that parts of 
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the country effectively protected by the military intervention and under control of the 
opposition, become de facto autonomous political entities. Now, as a consequence of the 
conflict, regions administered independently from Damascus actually exist on the Syrian 
territory under the control of opposition groups, Kurdish people or the IS. 
 Importantly, the Syrian conflict shifted from a pro-democracy protest to a sectarian 
war involving radical elements. This seems to indicate that early as 2011 and still actually, an 
intervention to protect people from retaliation by the Syrian regime would have had one 
important reasonable prospect, which is to prevent radical Islamic groups to gain further 
ground among the opposition to Bashar al-Assad. To the eyes of many oppressed Syrians, 
religious militants appears as a more serious way to obtain justice and freedom from tyranny, 












Figure 6: Application of the most similar system analysis to Libyan and Syrian crises. Most 
of the independent variables are similar in both cases. The two cases differ by their final 
outcome, the dependent variable. 
 
  Libya Syria 
Independent 
variables 
Just cause  + + 
Right authority  + - 
Right intention  + + 
Last resort  + + 
Proportional means  + + 
Reasonable prospects +/- +/- 
Dependent  
variable 
Military intervention for 
human protecting purposes  + - 
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Chapter 5. Conclusion  
How populations, left abandoned by their government and under threat of atrocities, can be 
protected by the international society? My thesis attempted to find answers to that question by 
examining two recent conflicts. The crises in Libya and Syria had fundamental elements in 
common, such as large-scale human right atrocities committed by the State on its own 
citizens, and the emergence of a civil war. However, the two crises differed significantly by 
the reactions they triggered in the international society. I have examined elements of the 
Libyan and Syrian crises to find out which are the facts that play a critical role in permitting 
the international society to intervene military for protecting the populations at risk.  
Based on guidelines set out by the ICISS, concerning when and how to intervene for 
humanitarian purposes, I have shown that both crises in Libya and Syria present features that 
can motivate such military intervention. In both cases, a military intervention may have been 
decided because the just cause, the right intention, the last resort, and the proportional means 
were satisfied. However, the two cases differ, as the right authority was present in one and 
not in the other. I showed that this criterion was a determining factor to cause different 
outcome for the cases, which is that military intervention took place in Libya, but not in Syria. 
The inspection of the Libyan and Syrian crises also reveals that the reasonable prospects can 
have a significant influence on both determining the decision of a military intervention and its 
success. 
Finding the right authority   
The attitude of the UN Security Council, viewed as the sole body with the 
responsibility for maintaining international peace and security has been determinant in 
shaping the international action in Libya and Syria. In Libya, the Security Council succeeded, 
at least partly, its goal to protect humanity from conflict by mandating the military 
intervention that halted Gaddafi’s regime attacks on civilians. The indecision of the Security 
Council regarding Syria is viewed as a dramatic failure of UN to protect humanity. Witness of 
an apparent dysfunction of the decision-making process in the Security Council, French 
diplomats proposed, in October 2013, a “code of conduct” for the use of veto. In situations of 
mass atrocities (genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing) the five 
permanent members (China, Russia, France, Britain and United States) should refrain from 
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using the veto. The change would be implemented through a mutual commitment from the 
permanent members thus avoiding to amend the UN Charter. “If the Security Council were 
required to make a decision with regard to a mass crime, the permanent members would agree 
to suspend their right to veto” (Fabius, 2013). In the French proposition, a common initiative 
from at least 50 member states of the UN General Assembly can lead the UN Secretary 
General to initiate an investigation on mass atrocities. Such measure could permit to elude 
quickly the nature of crimes when a crisis occurs. If the Secretary General has confirmed 
mass atrocities, the code of conduct would apply immediately in the Security Council. In 
order to be “realistically applicable”, such code of conduct would exclude cases where the 
vital interests of a permanent member of the Council are at stake (Fabius, 2013). However, if 
such changes were to be implemented in the UN system, a strong demonstration of the nature 
of “vital interests” would have to be required, in order to prevent a familiar deadlock of the 
Security Council in situations of humanitarian crisis. 
Political will: a worldwide commitment to address humanitarian crises 
 In the RtoP principle, the “political will” is a major factor that can influence the 
decision to intervene military for human protecting purposes. We understand the political will 
as the action a country provides for defending some goals, because these are judged either 
beneficial or morally just. In the modern era, the consent of the majority of the people is 
becoming increasingly important for the stability of political systems. In this context, it is 
beneficial for a government to show its real interest for human beings, even those living 
abroad. The moral responsibility is thus a powerful factor to raise concern in the international 
society and to initiate action towards resolving a humanitarian crisis. Because non-
interference is sometimes viewed as standing above the protection of humans, such moral 
responsibility is not always perceived as an obligation. However, a country may judge that 
solving a humanitarian crisis that takes place at its borders is good for its national interest, and 
would thus engage the political will to address the problem. The principle of RtoP may earn 
strength by showing that in a globalized world, a humanitarian crisis can have negative 
consequences for many countries located away from it. The Syrian crisis is one excellent 
example. First, Syrian refugees are mostly welcomed in neighbour countries, some of which 
are in dire economic situations and suffering from inter-community tensions. Second, the 
sectarian nature of the Syrian conflict promotes the radicalization of populations abroad, who 
identify themselves to one or the other part of the conflict. Some members of the Security 
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Council may feel that their country is not at risk there, but they never know if it might be the 
same when the next humanitarian crisis will unfold. The building of international solidarity is 
a reasonable prospect that may emerge from the increased involvement of the international 
society in taking action toward humanitarian crises.  
 In reality, most political leaders think with a shorter perspective, and one argument 
that can seriously oppose the decision of a military intervention for humanitarian purposes, is 
that such decision would have consequences that are unbearable for long-term peace. For 
example, one could argue that by preventing the Syrian Air force to operate and bomb 
civilians, you will contribute to the progression of terrorists groups. To refuse to act because 
of this reason does not necessarily offer better prospects, as the problem of civilian refugees 
fleeing to neighbour countries remains. In order to convince the international society to take 
action, a plan for military intervention has to be backed with measures that aim at addressing 
all the possible threats to peace in the host country. Ambitious measures should come with an 
extensive material support and should not refrain to include political changes, for example 
partition as in the case of South-Sudan, if it is necessary for long-term stabilization. The 
reasonable prospects of an intervention are ultimately dependent on the efforts that the 
international society can provide to rebuild the host country, to implement democratic 
institutions and to coordinate reconciliation. 
 
“Syrians haven’t given up. The world should not give up on them.” (UNOCHA, 2015 – 






	   65	  
References  
Literature list  
African Union, Press Release  (2011): The African Union ad hoc High-Level Committee on Libya 
convenes its second meeting in Addis Ababa. 25 March 2011. 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Press_release_-_Libya__eng__0.pdf [1. February 
2015]. 
ALJAZEERA (2013): Brahimi says Syria “horror unprecedented”. 30 January 2013. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/01/20131306312942823.html [20. January 
2015]. 
ALJAZEERA (2011): Libyan rebels reject African Union road map. 12 April 2011. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/04/201141116356323979.html [1. February 
2015]. 
Amnesty International (2011): The Battle for Libya: Killings, disappearances and torture. 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/MDE19/025/2011/en/ [11. July 2014].   
Amnesty International (2015): Syria: Evidence of a fresh war crime as chlorine gas attack kills entire 
family. 17 March 2015. https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2015/03/syria-war-crime-
chlorine-gas-attack/ [20.March 2015].  
Amnesty International (2014): Squeezing the life out of Yarmouk. War crimes against besieged 
civilians. March 2014.   
http://www.amnesty.eu/content/assets/Reports/Syria_report_Squeezing_the_life_out_of_Yar
mouk.pdf [13. November 2014].  
Amnesty International (2015): Syria's ‘Circle of hell’: Barrel bombs in Aleppo bring terror and 
bloodshed forcing civilians underground. 5 May 2015. 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2015/05/syrias-circle-of-hell-barrel-bombs-in-
aleppo/ [9 May].  
Amnesty International (2015): Syria: ‘Death everywhere’ - war crimes and human rights abuses in 
Aleppo, Syria. 4 May 2015.  https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde24/1370/2015/en/ 
[6. May 2015].  
Amnesty International (2014): Syria: Left out in the cold: Syrian refugees abandoned by the 
international community. 5 December 2014. 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/MDE24/047/2014/en/ [13. December 2014].  
	   66	  
Annan Kofi A. (2005): 2005 Offers Opportunity To Chart New, Hopeful Course For UN, Secretary 
General Says In Message To Council Of Europe Summit In Warsaw. United Nations 
Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. 16 May 2005. 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2005/sgsm9872.doc.htm [28. December 2014].  
Annan Kofi A. (2000): ‘We the Peoples’ The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century. New 
York: United Nations.   http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/We_The_Peoples.pdf 
BBC NEWS (2011): Key figures in Libya’s rebel council. 25 August 2011. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12698562 [10.February 2015]. 
BBC NEWS (2011): Libya sanctions extended by European Union. 11 March 2011. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-12697982 [1. March 2015].  
BBC NEWS (2011): Libya's new rulers declare country liberated. 23 October 2011. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15422262 [4. February 2015].  
BBC NEWS (2015): Syria conflict: Fresh UN-backed talks begin in Geneva. 5 May 2015. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32586767 [24. May 2015].  
BBC NEWS (2012): Syria Crisis: Kofi Annan quits as UN-Arab League envoy. 2 August 2012. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-19099676 [18. January 2015]. 
BBC NEWS (2012): Syria in civil war, Red Cross says. 15 July 2012. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18849362 [10. November 2014]. 
BBC NEWS (2015): Syria: The story of the conflict. 12 March 2015. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868 [1. May 2015]. 
Bellamy, Alex J. (2011): Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect. London, New York: 
Routledge. 
Bellamy, Alex J. (2010): “The Responsibility to Protect-Five Years On”. Ethics & International 
Affairs, 24 (2): 143-169.  
Bellamy, Alex J., Davies, Sara E. and Glanville, Luke (2011): The Responsibility to Protect and 
International Law. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff.  
Bellamy, Alex J. (2011): “Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm”. 
Ethics & International Affairs, 25 (3): 263-269.  
Bellamy, Alex J. (2005): “Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur a 
Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq”. Ethics & International Affairs, 9 (2): 31-54.  
Bellamy, Alex and Wheeler, Nicholas (2008): Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. pp. 522-539. 
Bellamy, Alex J. and Williams Paul D. (2011): “The New Politics of Protection? Côte d’Ivoire, Libya 
and the Responsibility to Protect.” International Affairs 87 (4): 825-850.  
	   67	  
Cameron, David, Obama, Barak and Sarkozy, Nicolas (2011): The bombing continues until Gaddafi 
goes. The Telegraph. 15 Apr 2011. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8452877/The-
bombing-continues-until-Gaddafi-goes.html [13. September 2014].   
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2015): Syria in Crisis: National Coalition for Syrian 
Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=50628 
[16. March 2015].  
Carter, Jimmy (2003): Just War — or a Just War? New York Times, 9 March 2003. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/09/opinion/09CART.html [8. May 2015].  
Central Intelligence Agency (2014): The World Factbook: Syria. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html [3. July 2014].  
Deng, Francis M., Kimaro, Sadikiel, Lyons, Terrence, Rothchild, Donald and Zartman, I.William 
(1996): Sovereignty as Responsibility. Conflict Management in Africa. Washington, D.C: 
Brookings Institution. 
Etzioni, Amitai (2005): Sovereignty as responsibility. Published by Elsevier Limited on behalf of 
Foreign Policy Research institute. http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/etzioni/documents/A347a-
SoverigntyasResponsibility-orbis.pdf [22.July 2014].  
France24 (2011): New Libya contact group to provide ‘political direction’. 29 March 2011. 
http://www.france24.com/en/20110329-london-creation-libyan-contact-group-post-gaddafi-
un-african-union-arab-league/ [1. March 2015].  
General Assembly (2005): 2005 World Summit Outcome. United Nations, Report A/60/L.1 paragraph 
139-139, 15 September 2005. http://www.who.int/hiv/universalaccess2010/worldsummit.pdf 
[10.August 2014].  
The Guardian (2012): The Houla massacre: reconstructing the events of 25 May. 1 June 2012.  
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/01/houla-massacre-reconstructing-25-may [20. 
January 2015].  
The Guardian (2012): Syria massacre: Assad’s forces ‘shot anything moving’. 15 July 2012. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/14/syria-bashar-al-assad-tremseh [20. January 
2015].  
The Guardian (2014): Russia and China veto UN move to refer Syria to international criminal court. 
22 May 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/22/russia-china-veto-un-draft-
resolution-refer-syria-international-criminal-court [26. February 2015].  
	   68	  
Human Rights Watch (2011): Libya: Arrests, Assaults in Advance of Planned Protests. 17 February 
2011. http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/16/libya-arrests-assaults-advance-planned-protests 
[11. July 2014].  
Human Rights Watch (2011): Libya: Government Should Demand End to Unlawful Killings. 20 
February 2011. http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/02/20/libya-governments-should-demand-
end-unlawful-killings [10. July 2014]. 
Human Rights Watch (2006): Libya: Words To Deeds. 25 January 2006. 
http://www.hrw.org/node/11480/section/2 [10 July 2014].  
Human Rights Watch (2012): NATO: Investigate Civilian Deaths in Libya. At Least 72 Dead in Air 
Attacks on Unclear Targets. 14 May 2012. http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/14/nato-
investigate-civilian-deaths-libya [13.August 2014].  
Human Rights Watch (2012): Unacknowledged Deaths. Civilian Casualties in NATO’s Air 
Campaign in Libya. 14 May 2015. http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/05/14/unacknowledged-
deaths [26.September 2014]. 
Human Rights Watch (2013): Attacks on Ghouta. 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/syria_cw0913_web_1.pdf [1. February 2015].  
Human Rights Watch (2015): Syria: New Spate of Barrel Bomb Attacks. 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/24/syria-new-spate-barrel-bomb-attacks [10. March 2015]. 
International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (2014): The Crisis in Syria. 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-syria [6.April 2014]. 
International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (2015): Libya Post-Gaddafi. 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/190-crisis-in-libya/5646-crisis-in-
libya-post-gaddafi [29. January]. 
International Commission On Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001): The Responsibility to 
Protect. Canada: International Development Research Centre.  
International Criminal Court (2015): About The Court. http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about%20the%20court/Pages/about%20the%20court.aspx [27. February 
2015]. 
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Libya (2011): Report of the International 
Commission of Inquiry to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law 
in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Human Rights Council 17th session, 1 June 2011. 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20A%20HRC%2017%2044.pdf [10. July 2014].  
	   69	  
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Libya (2012): Report of the International 
Commission of Inquiry on Libya. Human Rights Council 19th session, 8 March 2012. 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/a_hrc_19_68.pdf [10. July 2014]. 
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (2011): 1st  report of 
the Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. United Nations Human Rights 
Council 17th special session, 23 November 2011. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G11/170/97/PDF/G1117097.pdf?OpenElement [4.May 2014].  
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (2012): 2nd report of 
the Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. United Nations Human Rights 
Council 19th session, 22 February 2012. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G12/106/13/PDF/G1210613.pdf?OpenElement [4.May 2014].  
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (2012): 3rd report of 
the Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. United Nations Human Rights 
Council 21th  session, 16 August 2012. 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session21/A-HRC-
21-50_en.pdf [12. May 2014].  
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (2013): 4th Report of 
Commission of Inquiry on Syria. United Nations Human Rights Council 22th session, 5 
February 2013. 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A.HRC.22.59_en.pdf [22. 
July 2014].  
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (2014): 7th Report of 
Commission of Inquiry on Syria. United Nations Human Rights Council 25th session, 12 
February 2014. 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/Documentation.aspx [9. July 
2014].  
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (2014): 8th Report of 
Commission of Inquiry on Syria. United Nations Human Rights Council 27th session, 13 
August 2014. 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/Documentation.aspx [7. January 
2015].  
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (2015): 9th Report of 
Commission of Inquiry on Syria. United Nations Human Rights Council 28th session, 5 
	   70	  
February 2015. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/019/37/PDF/G1501937.pdf?OpenElement [2.May 2015]. 
Kaczmarski, Marcin (2011): Russia on the military intervention in Libya. OSW Osrodek Studiow 
Wschodnich. Centre for Eastern Studies. 23 March 2011. 
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2011-03-23/russia-military-intervention-libya 
[17. May 2015]. 
Kurth, James (2005): “Humanitarian Intervention After Iraq: Legal Ideals vs. Military realities”. 
Orbis, Winter 2005.  
Masri, Abdulrahman (2015): Syria: Proxy war, not civil war. Middle East Monitor. Creating New 
Perspectives. 14 March 2015.https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/middle-east/17515-
syria-proxy-war-not-civil-war [19. March 2015].  
Nachmias, D. & Nachmias, C. (1992): Research Methods in Social Sciences. New York: St. Martin’s.  
Obama, Barak (2014): Obama on the World. President Obama Talks to Thomas L. Friedman About 




on=Full&region=Marginalia&src=me&pgtype=article [30. November 2014].  
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (2014): OPCW	  Fact	  Finding	  Mission:	  
“Compelling	  Confirmation”	  That	  Chlorine	  Gas	  Used	  as	  Weapon	  in	  Syria.	  	  
	  	  	   http://www.opcw.org/news/article/opcw-fact-finding-mission-compelling-confirmation-that-
chlorine-gas-used-as-weapon-in-syria/ [9. January 2015].  
Reuters Africa (2011): TEXT-Excerpts from Libya Contact Group Chair's Statement. 15 July 2011. 
http://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFLDE76E0W120110715 [3. March 2015].  
Ringdal, Kristen (2007): Enhet og Mangfold. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget. 
Roberts, Adam (2000): “The so-called right to humanitarian intervention”. Yearbook of international 
humanitarian law. 3: 3-51.  
Rogan, Eugene (2011): The Arabs- A History. New York: Basic Books.  
Seale, Patrick (1986): The Struggle for Syria: a study of post-war Arab politics 1945-1958. London: 
Tauris. 
Security Council (2011): Draft Resolution. S/2011/612. United Nations, 4 October 2011. 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Syria%20S2011%20612.pdf [14. December 2014]. 
	   71	  
Security Council (2014): Draft Resolution. S/2014/348. United Nations, 22 May 2014. 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_348.pdf [20. December 2014].  
Security Council (2014): Resolution 2139. United Nations, 22 February 2014. 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2139.pdf [20.Decembre 2014].  
Security Council (2011): Resolution 1970. United Nations, 26 February 2011.  
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%20RES%201970.pdf [2. January 2015]. 
Security Council (2011): Resolution 1973. United Nations, 17 March 2011. 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%20RES%201973.pdf [2. January 2015]. 
Security Council Report (2011): Update Report No.1: Libya. 14 March 2011.  
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/update-report/lookup-c-glKWLeMTIsG-b-6621881.php 
[1. February 2015]. 
Security Council Report (2013): Security Council Deadlocks and Uniting for Peace: An Abridged 
History. October 2013. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-
4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Security_Council_Deadlocks_and_Uniting_for_Peace.pdf 
[1. March 2015].  
Selvik, Kjetil, Stenslie Stig (2007): Stabilitetens pris: Stat og Politikk i Midtøsten. Bergen: 
Fagbokforlaget. 
Seybolt, Taylor B. (2008): Humanitarian Military Intervention. The conditions for Success and 
Failure. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Sofer, Ken and Shafroth, Juliana (2013): The Structure and Organization of the Syrian Opposition.  
Centre for American Progress.  
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2013/05/14/63221/the-structure-and-
organization-of-the-syrian-opposition/ [16. March 2015].  
Stake, Robert E. (1994): “Case Studies”. Page 236-247 in Norman K. Denzin & Yvonna S. Lincoln 
Handbook of Qualitative Research. California: SAGE Inc. 
Syrian Medical Society (2015): https://www.sams-
usa.net/foundation/images/PDFs/Slow%20Death_Syria%20Under%20Siege.pdf [26. March 
2015]. 
Syrian National Council (2011): Syrian National Council SNC. 
http://www.syriannationalcouncil.com/AboutUsEN.html [12.August 2014].  
	   72	  
Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (2015): About 13000 detainee’s torture to death inside Bashar 
al-Assad’s jails. http://syriahr.com/en/2015/03/about-13000-detainees-tortured-to-death-
inside-bashar-al-assads-jails/ [22. March 2015]. 
Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (2015): The Syrian regime exploits the world’s preoccupation 
of the coalition airstrikes and carries out more than 10000 air raids over 5 months. 20 March 
2015. http://www.syriahr.com/en/2015/03/the-syrian-regime-exploits-the-worlds-
preoccupation-of-the-coalition-airstrikes-and-carries-out-more-than-10000-air-raids-over-5-
months/ [21.May 2015]. 
United Nations Action Group for Syria (2012): Final Communiqué. 30 June 2012. 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/FinalCommuniqueActionGroupforSyria.pdf 
[6.October 2014].  
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2015): Syria Regional Refugee Response. 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php [10. May 2015].	  
 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2011): Independent International Commission 
of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. United Nations Human Rights. 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/IndependentInternationalCommis
sion.aspx [4. January 2014].  
United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases (2015): Adopting Resolution 2209 (2015) 
Security Council Condemns Use of Chlorine Gas as Weapon in Syria. 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11810.doc.htm [11.March 2015].  
United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases (2011): In Swift, Decisive Action, Security 
Council Imposes Tough Measures on Libyan Regime, Adopting Resolution 1970 in Wake of 
Crackdown on Protesters. 26 February 2011. 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10187.doc.htm [12. January 2015].  
United Nations News Centre (2011): Russia and China vetoed draft Security Council resolution on 
Syria. 4 October 2011. 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39935#.VWL7klxe8Rc [16. May 2015]. 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2015): Syria.  
http://www.unocha.org/syria [26. May 2015].  
United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian 
Arab Republic (2013): Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area 
of Damascus on 21 August 2013. 13 September 2013. 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/content/slideshow/Secretary_General_Report_of_CW_Invest
igation.pdf [12. December 2014].  
	   73	  
United Nations News Centre (27 March 2015): UN envoy says Libya’s latest peace talks have gone 
“well beyond that we have expected”. 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=50438#.VSp8G1xe8Rc [10. April 2015].  
United Nations News Centre (2014): Russia, China block Security Council referral of Syria to 
International Criminal Court. 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47860#.VQ1Xh0JycRc [20. November 
2014]. 
United Nations News Centre (2011): UN rights council recommend suspending Libya, orders inquiry 
into abuses. 25 February 2011. 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37626#.VVx57lxe8Rc [29. March 2015]. 
Violation Documentation Centre in Syria (2015): Statistics for the numbers of martyrs. 
http://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/en/ [26. May 2015]. 
Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2013): Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk i Midtøsten. Kristiansand: Cappelen 
Damm.  
Wehrey Frederic (2014): Ending Libya’s Civil War: Reconciling Politics, Rebuilding Security. 
Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 24 September 2014.  
Weiss Thomas G. (2012): Humanitarian Intervention. Cambridge, Malden: Polity Press. 
Weiss Thomas G. (2004): “The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect 
in a Unipolar Era”. Security Dialogue. 35(2): 135-153.  
Welsh, Jennifer M. (2004): Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations. New York: 
Oxford University Press.  
Wheeler, Nicholas J. (2000): Saving Strangers. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Yin, Robert K. (2009): Case Study Research. Design and Methods. California: SAGE Inc.  
Sources and credits for the graphic documentation 
Figure 1.  
United Nations Cartographic Section Web Site (2012): Syrian Arab Republic. 
http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/syria.pdf [7.august 2014].  
Figure 2. 
Syrian American Medical Society (2015): https://www.sams-
usa.net/foundation/images/PDFs/Slow%20Death_Syria%20Under%20Siege.pdf [26. March 
2015]. 
Figure 3.  
	   74	  
United Nations Cartographic Section Web Site (2013): Libya. 
http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/libya.pdf [7.August 2014]. 
Figure 4. 
Amnesty International (2011): The Battle for Libya: Killings, disappearances and torture. 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/MDE19/025/2011/en/ [11. July 2014].   
Figure 5. 
Citizens of Kafranbel (2015):	  http://www.occupiedkafranbel.com/ [31. May 2015]. 
 
 
 
